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WHO DECIDES WHO DECIDES
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION?
CHIARA GIORGETII*
ABSTRACT

The past twenty years have witnessed a dramatic rise in international
adjudication, and especially in international investment arbitration. As
international investment arbitration has become more prominent and
pervasive, one of its fundamental tenets has come under fire: the practice
of having the parties themselves nominate one or more of the arbitrators.
Critics contend that party-appointed arbitrators are inherently biased and
thus propose eliminating party-appointments altogether. In this article, I
argue that moving away from party-appointed arbitrators is unwarranted
and unwise, and would too radically transform international investment
arbitration. Instead, I propose a simpler solution: adopting stricter
arbitrator challenge rules and enlarging the pool of arbitrators. There is
no need to gut the arbitration selection system to fix it. Instead, the
solution lies in improving the process of deciding who decides the world's
international investment disputes.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; LLM,
JSD (Yale). This paper benefitted from suggestions made at the International and
Comparative Law Colloquium at George Washington School of Law, the
European Society of International Law Research Forum, the Faculty Exchange
Colloquium at Temple University Beasely School of Law and the Faculty
Workshop at Richmond University School of Law. I am particularly grateful to
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Susan Karamanian, Pieter Jan
Kuijper, Sean Murphy, Catherine Rogers, Jeremy Sharpe, Guglielmo Verdirame,
Santiago Villalpando, Michael Waibel, and to my colleagues Corinna Lain and Jim
Gibson for their valuable comments. Fatema Munis provided excellent research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

The past twenty years have seen a tremendous rise in
international litigation.l
More parties are prone to use
international law mechanisms to resolve their disputes, and more
forums are available to resolve them. 2 Indeed, the multifaceted
growth of international dispute resolution is widely considered
"the single most important development of the post-Cold War
age."3 In today's interconnected world, the tools used to resolve
international disputes have never been more important.
1 As an example, of the 125 cases filed at the International Court of Justice
since 1947, 53 were filed after 1995, see List of Contentious Cases, INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JusTICE, http:/ jwww.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2013) (listing the name of all the contentious cases that have been
filed with the ICJ since its inception, including the fifty-three cases filed since
1995). Similarly, there were only thirty-eight cases filed with the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICISD) between 1972 and 1996,
while fifty cases were filed in 2012 alone. See ICSID Caseload Statistics, INT'L CTR.
FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTE, no. 2013-1, 2013, at 7, available at
https:/ I icsid. worldbank.org/ICSID /FrontServlet?requestType= ICSIDDocRH&ac
tion Val =Show Document&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English41
(representing diagrammatically the fact that fifty cases were registered with ICSID
during the 2012 calendar year indicating a sharp rise in international disputes as
compared to the period between 1972). Also consider that more than ninety
percent of the judgments in the European Court of Human Rights' first fifty years
were delivered between 1998 and 2009. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The
European Court of Human Rights, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 323, 324 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) (citing
50 Years of Activity: The European Court of Human Rights- Some Facts and Figures (E.
Ct. H.R. Pub., 2010), 3, 5).
2 See generally THE RULES, PRACfiCE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INT'L COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012) (outlining the spectrum of the international
arbitration field including the differing arbitral bodies, their performance and the
overall efficacy of the system) [hereinafter RULES OF INTERNATIONAL COURT].
3 Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 709, 709 (1999) (stating further that
the enormous expansion of the international judiciary will probably be seen by
future international lawyers and scholars as the single most significant post-cold
war development in international law). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, The

Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and
Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 697 (1999) (discussing the history of

international law and its contemporary ramifications, particularly the adherence
to previous judgments and court procedures and the dramatic increase in the rate
of change from ad hoc tribunals to permanent ones); Benedict Kingsbury,
Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?,

31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 679 (1999) (discussing the issue of the rapid
proliferation of international courts and tribunals and the increased activity of
many of the courts).
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The growing importance of international courts and tribunals
to resolve disputes has intensified scrutiny of their work. Nowhere
is this truer than in the international investment arbitration context
- the fastest growing area of international law 4 and the
preferred option for the settlement of investment disputes.~~s
International investment arbitration is a unique and semiprivate dispute resolution mechanism.6 International investment
tribunals are often challenged to resolve very complex cases, in
terms of both their public policy and financial implications.
Indeed, politically, international investment tribunals hear highly
significant and sensitive public issues with effects that go beyond
the claims of the parties; these claims include issues related to a
country's environmental policy, health regulations, and sovereign
debt restructuring.? For example, in 2007, tens of thousands Italian
bondholders, who lost substantial portions of their investment in
Argentina's sovereign debt, challenged that country's debt
restructuring policy upon alleged violations of international
investment law.s In 2009, after lengthy and acrimonious litigations
in both U.S. and Ecuadorian courts, the Chevron oil company
initiated international investment proceedings in the Hague,
against Ecuador, to contest billions of dollars that Ecuadorian
courts mandated Chevron pay for environmental damage to
11

11

11

4 Charles H. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 472.
s Christoph Schreuer, The Future of Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE

FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 787, 788
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani eta!. eds., 2011).
6 Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 471.
7 Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 156,
159-64 (2007) ("[A]rbitrators autonomously resolve core questions of public law:
whether legislation is discriminatory, whether regulation is expropriation,
whether a court decision is unfair or inequitable. The difficulty here is not that
these issues are resolved by international adjudication but that they are resolved
by private adjudicator without adequate supervision by public judges.").
s Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /5,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ~~ 68, 238(i)-(iii) (Aug. 4, 2011)
(formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others v. Argentine Republic). Note that the
decision on jurisdiction of this case recognized the right of qualified bondholders
to bring the case to an investment tribunal. The decision on the merit is still
pending. In the current economic climate, this decision is highly anticipated and
will likely have repercussion well beyond the present dispute.
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Ecuadorian land.9 More recently, in November 2011, tobacco giant
Philip Morris Asia challenged Australia's 2011 Tobacco Plain
Packaging Act, which requires cigarette companies to adopt plain
packages for cigarettes devoid of any individualized logo or
intellectual property.10
Further, in regards to state finances, claims brought by
investors can amount to a large part of the budget of respondent
states, so that "the findings of the tribunal may require major
adjustment to public policy." 11 Final awards often grant claimants
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.12 For example, a
recent decision awarded onshore crude producer Occidental
approximately $1.7 billion in a dispute against Ecuador.B Two

9 Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL, Case No. 2009-23, Claimant's Notice of Arbitration (Perm. Ct. Arb.
Sept. 23, 2009). See also Request of the Republic of Ecuador to the United States
Oune 28, 2011) (containing a request by Ecuador to submit the dispute regarding
international investment to an arbitral tribunal).
1o Philip Morris Asia (H.K.) v. Commonwealth of Australia UNCITRAL, Case
No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration (Perm Ct. Arb. Nov. 11, 2011). The case was
brought under the Honk Kong-Australia BIT and is still pending at the PCA.
Philip Morris Asia contests the public health effects of the law claims that the
regulation substantially deprives its investment of its value. Pleadings and
information are available on the web site of the Australian Government at:
http:/ Jwww.ag.gov.au/ internationalrelations/ internationallaw Jpages/ tobaccop
lainpackaging.aspx. A similar case was filed by the Swiss subsidiary of Philip
Morris against Uruguay under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT, in relation to
legislation adopted in 2008-09 by Uruguay, requiring all cigarettes manufacturers
to adopt a single presentation requirement. The case is FTR Holding S.A., Philip
Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) & Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (2010). The case is pending in front of an
ICSID Tribunal. For more information, see https:J Jicsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet.
n Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? (Nov. 5, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript at 2, quoted with permission) (on file with author).
12 See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003) (ordering the respondent to pay U.S. $269,814,000
plus interest accruing at a rate of ten percent to claimant); EDF Int'l S.A., SAUR
Int'l S.A. & Le6n Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/23, Award Gun. 11, 2012) (awarding claimants U.S.
$136,138,430 for damages plus interest); Kyriaki Karadeli, Eni Hit with Hefty Gas
Price Hike, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 25, 2012), http:/ /globalarbitrationreview.com
Jnewsjarticle/30846/ (highlighting the UNCITRAL panel in The Hague orderirlg
the Italian company ENI to pay €833 million to Dutch trader GasTerra).
13 Occidental Petroleum Corp., eta!. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/11, Award,~ 876(v) (Oct. 5, 2012).

436

U. Pa.

J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 35:2

pending cases claim damages for over four billion dollars each.14
To finance the settlement of an ICSID claim, for example, the
government of Paraguay recently decided to issue treasury bonds
for about U.S. $21 million.ls
Most international investment arbitrations are decided by a
three-member arbitral tribunal comprised of two party-appointed
arbitrators (one per side) and a presiding arbitrator, chosen either
by the parties themselves or by a neutral third-party. By and large,
the parties decide who resolves their international investment
disputes.
In recent years, this party-constructed system has come under
fire,16 Critics, focusing specifically on the selection of partyappointed arbitrators, argue that they are biased and lack diversity,
and are therefore inadequate to decide international disputes.17

14 Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, Case No. AA '227
(Perm. Crt. Arb.); Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07 /5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ~~ 68, 238(i)-(iii) (Aug. 4,
2011) (formerly Giovanna A Beccara & Others v. Argentine Republic).
15 Sebastian Perry, Paraguay to Settle ICSID Claim with Bond Issuance, GLOBAL
ARB. REV. Guly 19, 2013), http:/ /globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article
/31757 /paraguay-settle-icsid-claim-bond-issuance.
16 See generally Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies
Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45, 75-93 (2013)
(discussing the changing nature of investment arbitration).
17 Anthony DePalma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle
Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001,
www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscuretribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html (stating, in reference to NAFTA
arbitration, that "[t]heir meetings are secret. Their members are generally
unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a
small group of international tribunals handles disputes between investors and
foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems
questioned and environmental regulations challenged. And it is all in the name of
protecting the rights of foreign investors."). See also VAN HARTEN, supra note 7
(discussing the effect of a perceived lack of openness in the arbitration system in
terms of revealing the reasonirlg underpinning the reasoning of an award);
Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 489 (stating that critics argue that arbitration is
not suited for settlement of public law disputes as the arbitrators are "privately
contracted" by the parties); Behind Closed Doors: A Hard Struggle to Shed Some Light
on a Legal Grey Area, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2009, available at www.
economist.com/node/13527961 (reviewing the issue of transparency and secrecy
in international arbitration and assessing calls for increased transparency).
Published statistics refute this assertion. For example, ICSID found that in cases
decided by ICSID Tribunals as of 2012 under the rules of the ICSID Convention or
of the Additional Facility, only forty-eight percent of all the awards uphold claims
in part of in full, while twenty-two percent of the awards decline jurisdiction,
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Thus far, the debate is largely confined to polarized practitioners
who either defend the status quolB or suggest the elimination of the
party selection process entirely.19
I argue that both approaches miss the mark. In particular, the
radical changes now on the table are both unwarranted and
unwise, and would deprive the parties of one of the fundamental
reasons that led them to choose international arbitration: they are
the ones to decide who decides their dispute. In the end, one need
not gut the arbitration system to fix it. A better solution lies in
fixing it by adopting better challenges rules and enlarging the pool
of arbitrators.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, I first explain the
process by which arbitrators are selected, and then analyze the
selectivity requirements to become an arbitrator. In Part II, I
consider the problems with the current arbitrator selection process,
and ultimately reject the call to abandon the party-appointment
selection mechanism as a solution to these problems. In Part III, I
propose an alternative solution to reform the process rather than
gut it. In the end, reforms are necessary, and the ones I suggest
will be sufficient to rescue and strengthen the international
arbitration system.

twenty-nine percent dismiss claims, and one percent decide that claims are
manifestly without legal merits. See ICSID Caseload Statistics, supra note 1, at 13.
On this issue, see Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 477-487 (2009) (arguing that the international
arbitration system currently functions reasonably well without needing radical
structural overhaul) and Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (2007) (statistically
supporting the contention that more than 57.7% of cases end without investors
receiving an award or payment of an award).
18 See e.g., Charles N. Brower, Michael Pulos & Charles B. Rosenberg, So Is

There Anything Really Wrong with International Investment Arbitration as We Know
it?, in THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2012 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2013) (suggesting that
certain alterations or 'tweaks' to the system of appointment of arbitrators could be
beneficial to international arbitration).
19 See Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID
REV. F. INV. L.J. 339, 355 (2010) ("[M]y proposal that we turn our backs on the
practice of unilateral appointments."); Hans Srnit, The Pernicious Institution of the
Party-Appointed Arbitrators, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 33, 2010, at 1, available at
http:/ Jwww. vcc.columbia.edu/ files Jvale/ print/Perspective_33_Smit_2. pdf
(stating that "party-appointed arbitrators should be banned" unless their
affiliation to the party that nominated them is fully disclosed).
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THE ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

International investment arbitration is a sui generis dispute
resolution system rooted in public international law, which
characteristically involves disputes between a foreign private
investor and the state recipient of the investment.2D At its core, the
system seeks to create a neutral forum to arbitrate disputes
between foreign investors and host states21 and to provide an
impartial and reliable dispute resolution system outside national
courts of either of the parties involved.22 Parties' preference for
arbitration has made it "the first-choice method of binding dispute
resolution."23
State consent to settle investor disputes with international
investment arbitration is most often expressed in bilateral

20 For a short overview, see generally Brooks W. Daly, Pennanent Court of
Arbitration, in RULFS OF INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 2, at 37; Carolyn Lamm
et a!., International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in RULFS OF
INTERNATIONAL CoURT, supra note 2, at 77 (discussing in detail the establishment of

a neutral forum to decide disputes between states and foreign investors); Abby
Cohen Smutny, Arbitration Before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 2002 Bus. L. INT'L 367 (2002); Abby Cohen Smutny, ICSID Arbitration:
Procedural Review, 2 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 35 (2005) (discussing the
proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties which provides a
forum to settle disputes).
21 SCHREUER, supra note 5, at 788
("International arbitration provides an
attractive alternative to the settlement of investment disputes by national courts
or through diplomatic protection. Arbitration offers the parties the opportunity to
select arbitrators who enjoy their confidence and who have the necessary
expertise in the field. The private nature of the arbitration, assuring the
confidentiality of proceedings, is often valued by parties to major economic
development projects, although recently there have been calls for more
transparency in international arbitration.").
22 W. Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT'L
231, 235 (2002) ("The private actor is generally unwilling to subject itself to the
jurisdiction of the courts in command economies or economies in transition and
even when a local judiciary can boast a decree of independence, the prudent
foreign investor will be alert to subtle factors that could predispose a national
court in favor of the home-town team. For its part, the government that hosts an
international transaction or is a party to it is, ordinarily, unwilling to subject itself
to the jurisdiction of the national courts of the foreign investor.").
23 Adrian Winstanely, Why Arbitration Institutions Matter, LAW IN TRANSIDON:
CONTRACf ENFORCEMENT, Autumn 2001, at 33, 34; see id. at 33 (identifying several
reasons that explain parties' favor for arbitration, inCluding privacy and
confidentiality, cost-effectiveness, party-control, neutrality, and speed).
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international treaties (BITs).24 These treaties generally designate
investment arbitration to resolve disputes thus inserting a
predominately private international law dispute resolution
mechanism onto public international law.zs Indeed, Professor
Anthea Roberts calls international treaties the "platypus of
international law," because, although they share certain features
with better-known species, they remain a very distinctive and
exceptional animal.26

24 Indeed, the exponential growth of international investment in recent years
has resulted in a tangible increase in BITs between foreign states, as well as
regional and multilateral investment treaties. More rarely, consent can also derive
from a contract between the state and the foreign investor in relation to a
particular project or from national legislation. See Antonio R. Parra, The Settlement
of Investment Dispute: The Experience of ICSID in Transitional Countries and Elsewhere,
LAW IN TRANSITION: CONTRACf ENFORCEMENT, Autumn 2001, at 38, 39 (noting that
the number of BITs has risen from 400 by the end of 1990 to 2,000 in 2000, and
about 170 countries have signed one or more of these treaties.); see also Brower &
Schill, supra note 4, at 472 (explaining that "investment treaties have proliferated
to an unprecedented degree, having surged from less than 400 in 1989 to well over
2,500 bilateral, regional and sectorial treaties today" and that "the volume on
investor-state arbitrations under there treaties has risen just within the last decade
to well over two hundred, with new arbitrations being initiated on an almost
daily basis.").
2S Roberts, supra note 16, at 45 ("[T]he investment treaty system grafts private
international law dispute resolution mechanisms onto public international law
treaties. However, there are other ways to understand the beast based on the
regulatory relationship it establishes between host states (as governors) and
foreign investors (as governed)."). The prototypical investment dispute no longer
concerns a relatively easily identified case of nationali?ation of property without
payment of compensation. Instead, "[i]nvestors are increasingly challenging
specific regulatory actions [taken with respect to a particular investor] (such as the
denial of building or operating permits) or general regulatory measures [adopted
with respect to the public at large] (such as measures taken concerning the
economy, the environment, human rights, and health and safety)" where these
have adverse effects on foreign investors. Id. at 45-46. See also Andrea K.
Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv.
1269, 1270 (2008) ("Investment arbitration often involves public international law
grafted onto a substructure of private commercial arbitration.").
26 Roberts, supra note 16, at 93. In terms of origin, international treaties are
public international law agreements entered into by states acting in their public
capacities. In terms of procedure, they permit investors to bring arbitral claims
directly against states based on rules closely resembling those developed in the
private international law that governs international commercial arbitrations and
investor-state contracts. In terms of function, they empower privately constituted
arbitral tribunals to hear cases going to the heart of states' public, regulatory
powers. And in terms of subject matter, they require a sensitive balancing of
individual rights against societal interests, and economic interests against non-
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One of these distinctive features is that the parties involved in
the case - a private actor and a state - are largely in charge of
deciding who decides their dispute. In the section below, I first
explain how arbitrator selections are made, and then assess the
requirements used to select arbitrators.
2.1. How Are International Investment Arbitrators Selected?

Professor William W. Park, a frequent arbitrator, remarked that
the three key elements in international arbitration are "arbitrator,
arbitrator, arbitrator." 27 Indeed, because arbitration decisions
come from the arbitral panels, it is essential to understand who
selects the international arbitrators that take the decision- and who
gets selected.28 The selection and appointment of arbitrators in
international tribunals involves multiple steps, which depend on
the applicable international treaty and the institutional rules
applicable to the dispute.29
The specific applicable procedures are found in the relevant
dispute resolution instrument on which the parties rely to bring
the case, normally the applicable BIT or a regional investment and
trade agreement-3D Dispute resolution instruments generally
economic goals, in a manner reminiscent of human rights law and trade law
treaties. Id. at 93-94.
27 Catherine A. Rogers, The International Arbitrator Information Project: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOC (Aug. 9, 2012),
http:/ /kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/08/09/the-internationalarbitrator-information-project-an-idea-whose-time-has-come/ (citing Rusty Parks'
remark that, "[i]n real estate the three key elements are 'location, location,
location,' . . . in arbitration the applicable trinity is 'arbitrator, arbitrator,
arbitrator."').
28 Indeed, the legitimacy of judicial decision-making relies on the person
making the decision. This is all the more true in international investment
arbitration, which is essentially premised on the free acceptance by private parties
of the arbitral procedure. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the
International System, 82 AM. J. INTL L. 705 (arguing that decision makers who are
perceived as legitimate enhance the legitimacy of the dispute resolution system
itself). See also Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies,
41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 107, 110 (2009) (arguing that a legitimate international
adjudicative body is one whose authority is perceived as justified).
29 For an excellent discussion on the selection process at the International
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, see generally Ruth
Mackenzie et al., SELECfiNG INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND
POLITICS (2010).
30 More rarely, a contract or national investment law may also provide for
international investment arbitration as an option. See ICSID Caseload Statistics,
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provide for arbitration either under the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
other States (ICSID Convention), or under the Arbitration Rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).31 For example, the recently
redrafted 2012 U.S. Model BIT explains that claimants can submit
their claims under the ICSID Convention and ICSID Rules, the
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.32
supra note 1 (graphically indicating the number of cases registered in a calendar
year).
31 See Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States (amended April 2006) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention]; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010, G.A. Res. 65/22,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 Gan. 10, 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
(2010)]. In this article, I focus on ICSID and the PCA because the great majority of
the known international investment disputes are brought in one of these fora and
are resolved under their rules of procedures. Conclusions reached analyzing their
practice, therefore, provide generally applicable lessons.
32 U.S. MODEL BIT, art. 24(3) (2012), available at http:/ jwww.state.gov/e/
eb/ifd/bit/index.htm (indicating that "[p]rovided that six months have elapsed
since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to
in paragraph 1: a. under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure
for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both respondent and the non-disputing
Party are parties to the ICSID Convention; b. under the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, provided that either the respondent or the non-disputing party is a party to
the ICSID Convention; c. under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or d. if the
claimant and respondent agree, to any other arbitration institution or under any
other arbitration rules"). Similarly, Chapter Eleven of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFT A) contains provisions related to the settlement of
disputes related to cross-borders investors and provides that investors can submit
their claims under the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules or
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992), available at http:/ jwww.naftaalena.gc.ca/ enjview.aspx?x=299&mtpiiD=142 #A1125 (indicating that "[e]xcept
as provided in Annex 1120.1, and provided that six months have elapsed since the
events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to
arbitration under: (a) the ICSID Convention, provided that both the disputing
Party and the Party of the investor are parties to the Convention; (b) the
Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, provided that either the disputing Party or the
Party of the investor, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; or (c) the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules"). Other rules complete the procedural framework
applicable to ICSID disputes, including the ICSID Rules for Arbitration
Proceedings, the Administrative and Financial Regulations, the Rules of
Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings and the
Additional Facility Rules. These rules can be found on the website of ICSID at
https:j /icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ RulesMain.jsp. UNCITRAL rules
can be found on the PCA website at http:/ /pca-cpa.org/shownews
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As discussed below, the selection of the three-person arbitral
tribunal is done by the parties to the dispute themselves, or by a
neutral appointing authority.33 Each party typically appoints one
arbitrator, and the presiding arbitrator is selected by agreement of
the parties, or, more often, by an appointing authority.34

2.1.1. Selection by Parties
In most cases, each party in the dispute selects at least one
arbitrator. This allowance gives the parties substantial say on the
persons selected to judge their case, and is one of the most
important features of international arbitration.
As one
commentator explains "the selection of the party-appointed
arbitrator may be the most critical decision in an international

.asp?ac=actual&pag_id=1261. Similarly, the Permanent Court of Arbitration also
provides for additional and more specific rules. In December 2012, the
Administrative Council of the PCA adopted a new set of procedural rules, the
"PCA Arbitration Rules 2012," for the arbitration of disputes involving at least
one State, a State-controlled entity, or an international organization, which
consolidate previous rules of procedures. The new Rules are available at
http:/ jwww.pca-cpa.org/ showpage.asp?pag_id=1188. They are a consolidation
of four sets of PCA procedural rules from the 1990s - the Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes between Two States (1992), the Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State (1993), the
Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International Organizations and States
(1996), and the Optional Rules for Arbitration Between International
Organizations and Private Parties (1996).
33 There are three overall mechanisms to select international judges and
arbitrators: by the parties in the dispute, by a neutral party, or by election. As
discussed in details infra, in most international arbitrations, the parties themselves
can select their own arbitrators. Parties can also select ad hoc judges at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in certain circumstances. Second, arbitrators
can be selected by a neutral third party under certain circumstances, including
inaction by one of the disputing party, the selection of the President of the
tribunal and the selection of members of ad hoc committees. A neutral appointing
authority can also be tasked with the selection of specific arbitrators. Third,
judges in international courts are first nominated (usually by a national
nominating committee) and then elected by a decision making body of an
international organization (for example the General Assembly and the Security
Council of the United Nations). In UN courts, including the International Courts
of Justice and the International Criminal Court, the election of judges is partially a
political process subject to election campaigning and vote trading. See generally
Mackenzie et a!., supra note 29 (describing in detail the process of selecting
judges).
34 See generally Lamm et al., supra note 20.
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arbitral proceeding."3s It can be even at par with the choice of
counsel.36
For the parties, having a say in deciding their case is both
appealing and reassuring, and strengthens their support to the
entire process.37 Parties to international investment arbitration
consistently indicate party-appointment as a strong reason to
prefer arbitration to litigation.JB Professor Catherine Rogers calls
the notion of party-appointed arbitrators "the ultimate form of
forum shopping" because the arbitral tribunal can, in the absence
of party agreement, determine many pivotal procedural issues, as
well as the nature and conduct of hearings, the allocation of costs
and fees, issues of evidence, and of course the tribunal ultimately
decides the substantive outcome of the case.39
35 Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to
Consider, 17 MEALEYS INT'L ARB. REP. 10 (2002). Similarly, Wendy Miles notes

"[t]he constitution of the arbitral tribunal is one of the most important steps in an
international arbitration. The skills and qualifications of the arbitrator/ s and the
number of members on the tribunal may have significant impact on the
development of the dispute resolution and, ultimately, the award itself." Wendy
Miles, International Arbitrator Appointment, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 37 (2002).
36 See Constantine Partasides, The Selection, Appointment and Challenge of
Arbitrators, 5 VINDOBONA J. 217, 217 (2001) (observing that the ability of the parties
to influence the composition of the arbitral tribunal is one of the defining aspects
of the arbitral process and that "their power to appoint, and the power to
challenge, arbitrators are two of their most powerful tools").
37 See Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. OF INT'L
& COMP. L. 502, 503 (2006) (mentioning that the parties prefer the outcomes of
their disputes to be warranted by a fair legal process which involves an
independent legal analysis of the dispute); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of
International Arbitrators, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957 (2005) (stating that in modern
scenarios parties want the outcomes of their disputes to be warranted by reasons
from an impartial authority bound by law); Rogers, supra note 27 ("Empirical
studies consistently verify that parties' ability to select arbitrators is one of the
primary reasons they select arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.").
38 In view of the current debate on the best selection method for arbitral
tribunal, a recent survey asked private practitioners, in-house counsel and
arbitrators what were their preferred methods for selecting arbitrators. A
substantial majority of respondents (seventy-six percent) preferred the selection of
two co-arbitrators by each party unilaterally. The authors of the survey
concluded "these figures show that there is general disapproval of the recent
proposals calling for an end to unilateral party appointment." Paul Friedland &
Stavros Brekoulakis, 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred
Practices in the Arbitral Process, WHITE & CASE, p. 5 (2012),
http:// annualreview2012.whitecase.corn/
International_Arbitra tion_Survey_2012. pdf.
39 Rogers, supra note 27.
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The dispute resolution clause of most BITs typically provides
for the arbitration selection method to be adopted in the
proceedings. For example, the 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides that,
unless otherwise agreed by the disputing parties, the tribunal
shall comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each
of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the presiding
arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties. 1140
In the absence of choice, the ICSID Convention also contains
default rules. Under ICSID, the arbitral Tribunal shall consist of
three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the
third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by
agreement of the parties."41 UNCITRAL Rules contain a similar
provtston. They provide that if three arbitrators are to be
appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator." 42
11

11

11

40 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 32, at art. 27 (providing for the selection of
arbitrators). Likewise, NAFTA Article 1123 provides for the number of arbitrators
and method of appointment and explains that "unless the disputing parties
otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator
appointed by each of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the
presiding arbitrator, appointed by agreement of the disputing parties." NAFTA,
supra note 32, at art. 1123 (providing for the Number of Arbitrators and Method of
Appointment).
41 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 37 ("(1) The Arbitral Tribunal shall
be constituted as soon as possible after registration of a request pursuant to
Article 36 (2) (a) The Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven
number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree (b) Where the parties do
not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment,
the Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each
party and the third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by
agreement of the parties.").
42 The Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
commonly referred to as UNCITRAL Rules, were first adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1976 by G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N.
Doc. A/31/17 at 182 (Dec. 15, 1976) (recognizing the value of arbitration in the
settling of disputes) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976)]. The Rules
were revised in 2010 and the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules were adopted by the UN
General Assembly with G.A. Res. 65/22. They apply to arbitration agreement
concluded after August 15, 2010. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are recognized as
a very successful text and are used in a variety of cases, including disputes
between private commercial parties, investor-State disputes, State-to-State
disputes, and commercial disputes. The first paragraph of the UNCITRAL Rules,
art. 9 (2010) provides that "1. If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party
shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the
third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the arbitral tribunal."
The full text of the Rules can be found on the website of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at http:/ /PCA-CPA.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1064.
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Parties and their counsel spend substantial time and resources
selecting the party-appointed arbitrator, underlining the
importance of the issue. 43 A proposed arbitrator's prior decisions
and academic writings are scrutinized, as are any previous
professional positions and relations. 44 In selecting their candidates,
parties also take into consideration the applicable law, the forum,
the kind of dispute, the location, the nationality of the parties, as
well as many others issues.
Selection is also affected by a party's position in the case. For
the claimant, the choice of arbitrator comes early, as the claimant
has the right to nominate an arbitrator in the request for arbitration
with which the arbitration begins. Thus, as the claimant goes first,
the selection of the claimant's arbitrator is particularly delicate
because it is done without knowledge of any other member of the
tribunal or counsel for opposing party, and in the general posture
of the case.45 The selection is normally completed after serious
research by counsel representing the claimant in consultation with
the client.
The selection of arbitrators by the respondent state is also often
complex, as it involves the advice of several governmental agencies
43 Claudia T. Salomon advises to take five factors into consideration when
choosing an arbitrator: first, select someone with legal and professional
experience; second, choose an impartial but known party-appointed arbitrator
and a neutral president; third, choose an arbitrator who manages people well;
fourth, choose an arbitrator who demonstrates communicative proficiency and_
juridical open-mindedness; fifth and finally, choose an arbitrator with a
manageable case-load. See Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, Practical Guidelines for
Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International
Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395, 395 (1998) (emphasizing that selection of
an arbitrator by one party is the single most determinative step in arbitration);
Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider, 17
MEALEY's INT'L ARB. REP. 1, 1-4 (2002). See also Andreas Lowenfeld, The PartyAppointed Arbitrator in International Controversies - Some Reflections, 30 TEXAS INT'L
L. J. 59, 60 (1995) (reflecting on certain aspects of the process of selecting
arbitrators); James Wangelin, Effective Selection of Arbitrators in International
Arbitration, 14 MEALEY's INT'L ARB. REP. 69, 70 (1999) (citing Lord Hacking's list of
qualifications for an arbitrator).
44 LUCY REED, }AN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION
77-79 (2d. ed. 2011).
45 Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 13 ("The parties to investment arbitration
cases and especially their counsel spend a great deal of time and effort to
scrutinize the backgrounds of arbitrators, their relationship with the parties,
published works and prior appointments. The time spent on choosing the right
arbitrators suggests that the personality and background of the arbitrator matters
substantially for arbitration outcomes.").
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that can potentially be involved in the litigation. In the United
States, the office of the legal adviser of the State Department often
takes the lead, although it often consults with U.S. government
offices, including the Department of Commerce, the Treasury and
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.46 Given the growing
public relevance of international investment arbitration, the
selection of the arbitrator by the state also becomes essential, as it is
an important instrument for the state to broaden the dispute
beyond its bilateral terms and to include adequate consideration of
the public interest.47
In the great majority of cases, parties themselves select their
arbitrators; in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, this occurs up to seventy-five percent of the time. 48

2.1.2. Selection by Neutral Third-Parties
A neutral authority can also play a role in the arbitrators'
selection process under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules. The
neutral appointing authority selects an arbitrator when, as it is
often the case, there is no agreement among the parties on the
selection of the president of the arbitral tribunal, or when one of
the parties defaults in its selection.49
46 Jeremy K. Sharpe, Representing a Respondent State in Investment Arbitration,
in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACfiTIONER'S GUIDE

(Chiara Giorgetti ed.) (forthcoming Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 2014).
47 See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, The Selection of Arbitrators, in THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION
65 (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds., 2000) (discussing in some detail the
process of choosing the third-country arbitrators at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal).
48 Eloise M. Obadia, Remarks by Eloise M. Obadia at 105th ASIL Annual Meeting,
105 AM. Soc'y INT'L PROC. 74 (2011). Historically, of the total 850 appointments
made by ICSID in cases registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional
facility since its first case, 460 were made by parties. In 2012, party-appointed
arbitrators counted for 101 of the 139 appointments, showing a trend toward
greater party-selection. ICSID Caseload Statistics, supra note 1, at 19, 31.
49 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, r. 3 (amended 2006)
[hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules] (stating rule three titled Appointment of
Arbitrators to a Tribunal Constituted in Accordance with Convention Article
37(2)(b)) and provides that (1) If the Tribunal is to be constituted in accordance
with Article 37(2)(b) of the Convention: (a) either party shall in a communication
to the other party: (i) name two persons, identifying one of them, who shall not
have the same nationality as nor be a national of either party, as the arbitrator
appointed by it, and the other as the arbitrator proposed to be the President of the
Tribunal; and (ii) invite the other party to concur in the appointment of the
arbitrator proposed to be the President of the Tribunal and to appoint another
II

11

11
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In ICSID proceedings, if the respondent defaults or the parties
cannot agree on a president, the Chairman of ICSID's
Administrative Council, who is also the President of the World
Bank, will appoint the missing arbitrators.so In his choice of
arbitrators, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council is
restricted to those people listed in a Panel of Arbitrators, which
contains names of arbitrators selected by ICSID Contracting Parties
and by the Chairman.sl The Chairman also selects the three

arbitrator; (b) promptly upon receipt of this communication the other party shall,
in its reply: (i) name a person as the arbitrator appointed by it, who shall not have
the same nationality as nor be a national of either party; and (ii) concur in the
appointment of the arbitrator proposed to be the President of the Tribunal or
name another person as the arbitrator proposed to be President; (c) promptly
upon receipt of the reply containing such a proposal, the initiating party shall
notify the other party whether it concurs in the appointment of the arbitrator
proposed by that party to be the President of the Tribunal. (2) The
communications provided for in this Rule shall be made or promptly confirmed in
writing and shall either be transmitted through the Secretary-General or directly
between the parties with a copy to the Secretary-General"). See also ICSID
Convention, supra note 31, at art. 37.
50 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 38 ("If the Tribunal shall not have
been constituted within 90 days after notice of registration of the request has been
dispatched by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph (3) of Article
36, or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman shall, at the
request of either party and after consulting both parties as far as possible, appoint
the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed. Arbitrators appointed by the
Chairman pursuant to this Article shall not be nationals of the Contracting State
party to the dispute or of the Contracting State whose national is a party to the
dispute."). In practice, what happens is that once the ninety days have expired,
the ICSID Secretariat would first try to find an agreement between the parties. To
that end, they will first propose to the parties a roster of three persons and ask the
parties to advise the Secretary General - and not each other - whether they would
agree on these proposals, without explanations. If the parties agree, then the
person is named and becomes the president of the tribunal. This result would be
counted as a party-selection. See Obadia, supra note 48, at 76. NAFTA similarly
provides that if the tribunal is not constituted within ninety days from the date of
the claim submission to arbitration, the Secretary-General, on the request of either
disputing party, shall appoint the arbitrators not yet appointed. See also NAFTA,
supra note 32, at art. 1124(2), 275 (providing that "If a Tribunal, other than a
Tribunal established under Article 1126, has not been constituted within 90 days
from the date that a claim is submitted to arbitration, the Secretary-General, on
the request of either disputing party, shall appoint, in his discretion, the arbitrator
or arbitrators not yet appointed, except that the presiding arbitrator shall be
appointed in accordance with paragraph 3").
51 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 40 (" (1) Arbitrators may be
appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, except in the case of
appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article 38."). Each contracting state
has a right to designate up to four persons to the Panel of Arbitrators. The
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members of ad hoc annulment committees, a special, party-led
procedure that offers limited review on awards. When selecting
members of ad hoc annulment committees, the Chairman is also
limited to nominate only members from the Panel of Arbitrators
and cannot designate those nominated to the Panel of Arbitrators
by either of the two States involved.52
Similarly, under both the UNCITRAL Rules of 1976,53 and
2010,54 parties can request the Secretary General of the PCA to
designate an "appointing authority" for the purpose of appointing
an arbitral tribunal if they fail to do so by the proscribed limit of
thirty days.55 In addition, under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, a
party may also propose that the PCA Secretary General himself
acts as the appointing authority. 56
UNCITRAL provisions also specify how the appointing
authority should make his nomination. First, at the request of one
of the parties, the appointing authority communicates to both
parties an identical list containing at least three names for possible
appointment as arbitrator. Second, within a specified deadline,
each party returns the list to the appointing authority after deleting
the names to which the party objects and numbering the remaining
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Tribunal can designate ten persons. The
appointment is for ten years, but it can continue until the nomination is expressly
revoked.
52 The latest published ICSID Statistics explain that as of May 20, 2012, there
were 158 signatories to the ICSID Convention. See List of Contracting States And
Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID (Nov. 1, 2013), https:/ /icsid.
worldbank.org/1 CSID j FrontServ let?requestType= ICSIDDocRH&actionVal =Sho
wDocument&language=English. Under ICSID Convention, article 13, each
Contracting party may designate to the Panel of Arbitrators four persons,
including its nationals. The Chairman can designate ten persons, each having a
different nationality. Not all contracting states have exercised their right to
nominate. Obadia states that there were 350 persons designated to the panel of
arbitrators in April2011. See Obadia, supra note 48, at 75.
53 Note that under UNCITRAL Rules, the first attempt to choose the
presiding arbitrator is given to the two part-appointed arbitrators. U.N. Comm'n
on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 6, 7, 12,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976).
54 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Arbitration Rules (as
revised in 2010), G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 6.8-13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 Gan. 10,
2010).
55 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 111TH ANN. REP. 1 (2011).
For an
interesting overview of the PCA' s appointing authority activity in 2011, see id. at
11-13.
56 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 6.
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names on the list in the order of preference. Third, and finally, the
appointing authority will select the missing arbitrators following
the preferences outlined by the parties.s7 The majority of the
requests to appoint Respondent's arbitrators were withdrawn as
the selection was then made by the party itsel£.58
After detailing who decides, the next section examines who can
be nominated, and thus be asked to decide.
2.2. Eligibility Criteria: Qualifications and Competences of

International Arbitrators
In addition to providing a framework that specifies how to
select arbitrators, applicable rules of procedure also require
arbitrators to possess certain legal qualifications and competences,
which, as discussed below, are rather general.S9
2.2.1. Nationality

First, under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, certain
nationality restrictions apply. Under Article 39 of the ICSID
Convention, the majority of the Tribunal must be "nationals of
States other than the Contracting State party to the dispute and the
Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute."6o To
57 See id. at art. 6. See also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42,
at art. 7.
58 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 55, at 11-13. Note that in
2011, under the above UNCITRAL provisions, the PCA received eighteen new
requests for the Secretary-General to designate an appointing authority for the
appointment of arbitrators and ten requests for the Secretary-General to act as
appointing authority for the appointment of arbitrators. Among these, eight
relate to the appointment of the presiding arbitrator or a sole arbitrator. Id.
59 Note that more recently, newly constituted courts and tribunals have
added more detailed requirements for selection. Specifically, the Statute of the
recently established International Criminal Court requires judges to have
expertise in criminal law and procedure or, alternatively, have expertise in
international humanitarian law and human rights law. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 36, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 Guly 17, 1998)
(requiring geographical distribution and representation of the principle legal
systems of the world, as well as a fair representation of female and male judges).
60 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 39 ("The majority of the arbitrators
shall be national of States other than the Contracting State party to the dispute
and the Contracting State whose national is a part to the dispute and the
Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute; provided, however,
that the foregoing provisions of this Article shall not apply if the sole arbitrator or
each individual member of the Tribunal has been appointed by agreement of the
parties.").
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avoid that the party making the first appointment selects one of its
nationals, and thus blocks the other party from doing the same,
Rule 1(3) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules requires the consent of the
other party to appoint national arbitrators.61
Rules under UNCITRAL are similarly general, but are
somehow less stringent in relation to nationality requirements.
Article 7 of UNCITRAL requires the appointing authority to only
take into account "the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a
nationality other than the nationalities of the parties."62
The reasons for the exclusion of arbitrators who share the same
nationality with one of the parties can be found in the presumption
that such arbitrators may be perceived as being too close to the
appointing party, and therefore be inclined to be excessively
sympathetic to that party's position. As Swigart observes, "as an
identifier, nationality suggests more than a mere category of
citizenship or allegiance to a particular state."63 Nationality, as
explained below, is also an important mark of diversity.64

61 ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 49, at r. 3, 104-05 (" (1) If the Tribunal is
to be constituted in accordance with Article 37(2)(b) of the Convention: (a) either
party shall in a communication to the other party: (i) name two persons,
identifying one of them, who shall not have the same nationality as nor be a
national of either party, as the arbitrator appointed by it, and the other as the
arbitrator proposed to be the President of the Tribunal.").
62 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, at art. 6(4); UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 6(7).
63 Leigh Swigart, The "National Judge": Some Reflections on Diversity in
International Courts and Tribunals, 42 McGEORGE L.R. 223, 224 (2010) ("Like their
domestic counterparts, international courts and tribunals depend on public faith
in their judges to inspire confidence in court decisions and in the judicial system
more generally. These courts look for the same qualities in their judges as those
laid out in national codes of conduct and other documents like the Bangalore
Principles of Judicial Conduct, such as independence, impartiality, integrity,
propriety, equality, competence, and diligence. Both domestic and international
courts also recognize that some relationships, involving such things as a prior
connection to a case or the parties or an interest in the outcome of the case, might
give rise to actual or perceived partiality. International courts, however, have
something to contend with that domestic courts do not. Unlike domestic courts,
international courts must consider the nationalities of its judges, and how these
nationalities may affect the judges' ability to decide cases involving their states of
origin with impartiality and independence. While this concern can be an issue in
all of the major categories of international courts and tribunals - i.e., human
rights, interstate dispute resolution, and criminal - it may be most relevant in
cases where states themselves are the parties before the court.").
64 See infra Parts II.B, III. B.

2013]

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

451

2.2.2. Impartiality and Independence

In addition to nationality restrictions, arbitrators must be
impartial and independent, and these qualifications are expressed
in a different, yet similar, way in the rules. As practitioner Noah
Rubins explains, "independence and impartiality are two distinct
but interrelated qualifications, required of every arbitrator."65
Impartiality fundamentally means that an arbitrator "is not
partial-or biased-in favor of, or against, a particular party or its
case, while an independent arbitrator is one who has no close
relationship-financial, professional or personal-with a party or
its counsel." 66
The qualification of these requirements is at times complex and
their assessment in practice can be difficult. As observed recently
by a tribunal rejecting an arbitrator challenge based on alleged lack
on impartiality,
[t]he concepts of independence and impartiality, though
related, are often seen as distinct, although the precise
nature of the distinction is not always easy to grasp.
Generally speaking independence relates to the lack of
relations with a party that may influence an arbitrator's
decision. Impartiality, on the other hand, concerns the
absence of a bias or predisposition toward one of the
parties.67
Both qualities are necessary for an arbitrator to perform his or
her adjudicative function.
Upon constitution of the tribunal, each arbitrator is also
required to sign a declaration confirming that, to the best of his
knowledge, there are no reasons why he should not serve as an
arbitrator, that he will keep confidential all information received
and that he will "judge fairly as between the parties, according to

Noah Rubins & Bernhard Lauterburg, Independence, Impartiality and Duty of
in Investment Arbitration, in INVESTMENT AND COMMEROAL
ARBITRATION -SIMILARITIES AND DIVERGENCES 153, 154. (Christina Knahr et al. eds.,
2010) (citation omitted).
66 Partasides, supra note 36, at 219.
67 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., & InterAguas
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the
Arbitral Tribunal~ 29 (Oct. 22, 2007) (citations omitted).
65
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the applicable law, and shall not accept any instruction or
compensation with regard to the proceedings from any source
except as provided" by the ICSID Convention.6B
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976):
A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who
approach him in connexion with his possible appointment
any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as
to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once
appointed or chosen, shall disclose such circumstances to
the parties unless they have already been informed by him
of these circumstances.69

68 ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 49, at r. 6. The full text of the signed
statements states:

To the best of my knowledge there is no reason why I should not serve
on the Arbitral Tribunal constituted by the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes with respect to a dispute between
_ _ and _ _ . I shall keep confidential all information coming to my
knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceeding, as well as
the contents of any award made by the Tribunal. I shall judge fairly as
between the parties, according to the applicable law, and shall not accept
any instruction or compensation with regard to the proceeding from any
source except as provided in the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States and in
the Regulations and Rules made pursuant thereto. Attached is a
statement of (a) my past and present professional, business and other
relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other circumstance that
might cause my reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by
a party. I acknowledge that by signing this declaration, I assume a
continuing obligation promptly to notify the Secretary-General of the
Centre of any such relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises
during this proceeding.
Id. Each Arbitrator must sign the declaration before or at the first session of the
Tribunal, failing to do so by the end of the first session of the Tribunal shall be
deemed tantamount to resignation.
69 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, at art. 9. UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 11 amended the text of the article to
state that:
When a person is approached in connection with his or her possible
appointment as an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any circumstances
likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or
independence. An arbitrator, from the time of his or her appointment
and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose
any such circumstances to the parties and the other arbitrators unless
they have already been informed by him or her of these circumstances.
Id.
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The appointing authority is similarly tasked to have regard for
considerations that are "likely to secure the appointment of an
independent and impartial arbitrator." 70
Independence and
impartiality remain difficult to define. As explained in more detail
below, an arbitrator's subjective biases cannot be known, and can
only be inferred from his or her conduct. 71 There are no objective
tests that can fully evaluate an arbitrator's personal conduct.
2.2.3. Legal Expertise and Other Requirements

Under the ICSID Convention, arbitrators must be persons of
"recognized competence" in the fields of law, as well as commerce,
industry, or finance.n A proposal to require arbitrators to be
lawyers was discussed and rejected during the negotiations of the
ICSID Convention, as it was deemed to be excessively restrictive.73
Additionally, it was widely acknowledged that both the parties
and the appointing authorities take into consideration other
elements when making their selection. These include legal
background, knowledge of the specific technical field and of the
applicable law, and knowledge of the language of the proceeding
and of the documents.74
These apparently simple selection methods result in the
selection of a small group of highly talented international
arbitrators, who are generally experienced lawyers of high
70 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, art. 6(4); UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 6(7).
71
See infra Parts II.A, III. A.
72 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 14(1).
73 See KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 84 (2012) (noting that the rules reflect a compromise:
arbitrators do not have to be lawyers, but must be reasonably competent in the
field of law).
74 See Obadia, supra note 48, at 76.
Obadia notes that several issues are
considered when making an appointment, including "language of the
proceedings, but also of the documents, as it may be different." She also explains
that, when making appointments

we also look at availability of the arbitrators ... experience of the
candidate as an arbitrator, not only in investment arbitration but also in
commercial arbitration and other types of arbitration ... knowledge of
the relevant law, which is often public international law, and the
knowledge of international investment law, which has become more and
more complex.
Id. Finally, "the cohesiveness of the tribunal" is also a factor.
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international standing, often multilingual and capable of handling
complex cases involving complicated sets of facts, diverse
applicable law and rules of procedures, and multi-cultural
parties.75 Most generally, the group is composed of public
international law academics and international law practitioners.
The extent of the system's success is a distinct question, which
is explored in the next part.
3.

DOES ARBITRATOR SELECTION WORK? AN ASSESSMENT

The international investment arbitrator selection system
appears straightforward and effective from afar.
Certain
problematic issues become more apparent on closer scrutiny,
however. First, some practitioners and experts have criticized the
idea of the party-appointed arbitrator because of the possible builtin biases in favor of the party that appointed him or her.76 Second,
critics have focused on the fact that a very small number of
individuals make up the vast majority of arbitrators and that
arbitration panels include too many repeat appointments and lack
diversity.77
Critics claim that these two flaws fatally undermine decisions
taken by international investment tribunals and that, as a
consequence, party-appointments must be eliminated. I address
these issues below.

3.1. Criticisms of the Party-Appointment System Based on Innate Bias
Practitioners and other stakeholders have taken issue with the
institution of the party-appointed arbitrator.78 The criticisms focus
on innate biases that arbitrators may have in favor of the party that

75 See Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, supra note 37, at 958-59
(noting that "[i]nternational arbitrators are exceptionally talented individuals"
with diverse language skills, excellent educational backgrounds, and extensive
legal experience as well as expertise in other industries; furthermore, "their
cumulative credentials are frequently parlayed into professorships and enhanced
by rich scholarly research") (footnotes omitted).
76 See infra section 3.1.
77 See infra section 3.2.
78 Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson's
Moral Hazard in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010),
http:/ /kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/ are-unilateralappointrnents-defensible-on-jan-paulsson%E2%80%99s-moral-hazard-ininternational-arbitration.
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appointed them and against the opposing party. 79 Critics claim
that innate biases would result in a propensity of the partyappointed arbitrator to be too sympathetic to the arguments put
forth by the appointing party, pressuring other arbitrators to reach
a solution that is particularly advantageous to that party, or at least
not too disadvantageous to it.BD The issue is whether partyappointed arbitrators suffer from inevitable bias: does the very
nature of party appointment skew their incentives from the start?Bl
The assessment is difficult. For example, in considering a
challenge of an arbitrator for alleged lack of impartiality due to the
arbitrator's prior ruling against the respondent in a similar ICSID
prior case, the arbitral tribunal in charge of resolving the challenge
rejected the challenge and acknowledged that:
Independence and impartiality are states of mind. Neither
the Respondent, the two members of this tribunal, or any
other body is capable of probing the inner workings of any
arbitrator's mind to determine with perfect accuracy
whether that person is independent and impartial. Such
state of mind can only be inferred from conduct either by
the arbitrator in question or persons connected to him or
her.B2
The difficulty in assessing the possible lack of impartiality is an
important criticism.s3 Some specialists and practitioners have

79

80

Id.
Id.

81 See David Branson, Sympathetic Party-Appointed Arbitrators: Sophisticated
Strangers and Gavernments Demand on Them, 25 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 367,

368 (2010) (noting that party-appointment of arbitrators is subject to 'moral
hazard' if "one party-appointed arbitrator sees a 'duty' to act for the benefit of the
appointing party and the other follows the dictates of the law and remains
neutral, then there is imbalance, the process can be unfair and it can produce
injustice").
82 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., & InterAguas
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the
Arbitral Tribunal ~ 30 (Oct. 22, 2007).
83 See Srnit, supra note 19, at 1 ("Once selected, an arbitrator's personal
incentive is to secure reemployment by providing his or her party with a
favorable outcome."). For a discussion of repeating arbitrators, see generally
Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, The Rising Issue of 'Repeat Arbitrators': A Call for Clarification,
25 ARB. INT'L 103 (2009) (arguing that the issues of 'repeated appointment' and
'repeat arbitrator' are in need of more attention and to tackle the issues, more
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pointed out that a non-neutral arbitrator can disrupt the process in
several ways including: delaying meetings, refusing to participate
in proceedings,84 and issuing damaging dissents.ss
International investment arbitrators themselves are weary of
the system. For example, the late Hans Smit also acknowledged
that party-appointed arbitrators could feel pressured to decide in
favor of the party that appointed them. This sentiment could
materialize in many forms, including a reluctance to vote against
the appointing party and a tendency to advocate for reduced
awards or costs. Smit observed: "The incentive of the party and its
counsel is to appoint an arbitrator who will win the case for them.
That incentive will be particularly strong when its case, on its
merits, is not particularly strong."s6
He also noted that,
Even if arbitrators are willing to rule against the party that
appointed them, there are still ways in which they can
influence the final outcome of a case to favor their party.
For example, they may try to persuade the other panel
members to reduce the award in favor of their party in
return for joining them in a unanimous award. This
compromise will ordinarily be attractive to the chair of the
panel, for his or her reputation for obtai11ing unanimous
awards may increase the likelihood of being appointed to
future panels. Even if the award is not affected, the partyappointed arbitrator may bargain for not awarding counsel
fees .... It might be argued that these are relatively minor
disadvantages, that there is virtually always reason for
compromise and that this is an acceptable price to be paid.
But it is not only untoward compromises that the
institution of party-appointed arbitrators promotes. The
presence of a partisan arbitrator on a panel will normally
comprehensive definitions of 'repeated appointment' and 'repeat arbitrator' are
necessary).
84 NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PART ASIDES, ALAN REDFERN, &J. MARTIN
HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 320-25 (2009).

ss Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields- Lecture Dissenting Opinions in
International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT'L
223, 242 (2004) (suggesting that arbitrators can be collaborative and fulfill their
duties with diligence or rebellious and refuse to participate in the proceeding and
also issuing ugly dissents).
86 Smit, supra note 19, at 1.
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reduce, if not eliminate, the free exchange of ideas among
the members of the panel. The chair will be less receptive
to arguments that appear to be moved by partisan
considerations or may join one of the arbitrators, with the
result that the other party-appointed arbitrators feel
excluded from the deliberations.87
Other well-known arbitrators share this sentiment and identify
the culprit in the party-appointment process. For example, Albert
Jan van den Berg notes that "[t]he root of the problem is the
appointment method.
Unilateral appointments may create
arbitrators who may be dependent in some way on the parties that
appointed them."ss Yves Derains argues that party-appointed
arbitrators are often too partial and that they can create
"pathologic" deliberations within the tribunal.B9 Jan Paulsson
maintains that a party's paramount desire to win results in
speculation about "ways and means to shape a favorable tribunal
or at least to avoid a tribunal favorable to the other side." 9o
Indeed, recent empirical data also show a possible connection
between the selection and how the case is ultimately resolved. An
important new study by Waibel and Wu, for example, analyzes 388
ICSID cases from 1978 to 2011. The study finds that arbitrators
who are normally appointed by claimants in ICSID cases are more
likely to affirm jurisdiction, while arbitrators who are often
appointed by host states in general are less likely to uphold

Id. at 2.
Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators
in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FU1URE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 834 (Mahanoush Arsanjani eta!. eds.,
2010).
89 Yves Derains, Fifth Annual International Commercial Arbitration Lecture: The
Arbitrator's Deliberation, 27 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 911, 913-919 (2012).
90 Jan Paulsson, Inaugural Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein
Distinguished Scholer Chair at the Miami University School of Law 11 (Apr. 29,
2010), available at http:/ /www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999020/
paulsson_moral_hazard.pdf. See also Jan Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments
Defensible?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOC, (Apr. 2, 2009), http:/ jkluwerarbitration
blog.com/ blog/ 2009/04/02/ are-unilateral-appointments-defensible j (criticizing
the mechanism of appointment of arbitrators by party and suggesting possible
alternatives, including selection by a neutral institution or the use of list for the
appointment of all arbitrators, following the example of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport).
87
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jurisdiction.91 The authors conclude that "arbitrators who are proinvestor/pro-host state tend to vote in favour of the investors/host
state."92 Data also shows that dissenting opinions are more often
produced by arbitrators appointed by the losing party in the
arbitration. Indeed, this is the case in nearly all the cases
surveyed.93

3.2. Criticisms of the Party-Appointment System Based on the Lack of
Diversity
Aside from possible systemic biases, a chief complaint of partyselected arbitrators is their limited number and demographic
characteristics. Indeed, arbitrators have been typecast as "pale,
male and stale."94
Newly available data analyzed the profile of those who have
been selected to sit on international investment tribunals, taking
into consideration gender, nationality, professional background,
legal education, and method of appointment. These data
empirically support some of the anecdotal unease associated with
international arbitration, painting a picture of a system which is
not diverse or representative, and where the same few people tend
to be reappointed time and again.9s

91 See Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 34-35 (concluding that data show that:
(1) female arbitrators, arbitrators who also act as counsel and those with
experience in international organizations are more likely to affirm jurisdiction; (2)
arbitrators from developing countries are more likely to decline jurisdiction; (3)
arbitrators from the same legal family as the host country are less likely to affirm
liability; and (4) those with experience in international organizations and those
that have served often as presidents are more likely to affirm liability).
92 Id. at 36. For a slightly older, but thorough analysis of the voting behavior
of ICSID arbitrators, see Rogerio Carmona Bianco, The International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID): An Empirical Research on the Voting
Behavior of Arbitrators (Working Paper, 2009) available at http:/ /papers.
ssm.comjsol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1514882 (analyzing the voting behaviors
of ICSID arbitrators based on empirical data collected from ICSID).
93 van den Berg, supra note 88, at 824-25.
94 See Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Presidente: A Woman Who Sits As
President of a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature. Why?, AM. LAW: Focus EUR.
(2004) ("Arbitration is dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered
the field. In the words of Sarah Fran<;ois-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are
'pale, male, and stale."').
95 See Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 17, at 437 (stating that
national origin of arbitrators impacts results of arbitration).
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The most recent ICSID statistics show that 68% of all
appointments in cases registered and administered by ICISD are
from Western Europe and North America.96 Conversely, only
about 6% of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention and
Additional Facility Rules include a State Party from North America
or Western Europe.97 Interestingly, although about 85% of the
cases are brought by an investor from a developed country against
a developing country, only about one third of the arbitrators come
from developing countries.98
An analysis of gender representation shows an even more
striking lack of diversity.99 As of May 2010, only 6.5% of all
arbitrators appointed in investment treaty arbitration were
women.1oo Disappointingly, the percentage actually falls to 5.63%
96 These include 704 arbitrators appointed by parties and 230 appointed by
ICSID. ICSID Caseload Statistics, supra note 1, at 18-19 (showing that the
appointment of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc Committee Members appointed
in cases registered under the ICSID Convention and the Additional Facility Rules
were geographically distributed as follows: forty-six percent Western Europe;
twenty-two percent North America (Canada, Mexico and the United States);
eleven percent South America; ten percent South and East Asia and the Pacific;
five percent Middle East and North Africa and two percent each from Central
America & the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa).
97 Id. at 11 (showing the following geographical distribution all ICSID cases
by State Party Involved: one percent Western Europe; five percent North America
(Canada, Mexico and the United States); thirty percent South America; nine
percent South & East Asia & the Pacific; ten percent Middle East and North
Africa; six percent Central America and the Caribbean and sixteen percent SubSaharan Africa).
98 Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 27.
99 The paucity of international women judges is common in international
courts and tribunals and has been subject of several recent interesting studies. See
Grossman, supra note 28; see also LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., LCHR's CHART
SHOWING GENDER AND REGIONAL BALANCE IN ELECfiONS TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND
TRIBUNALS,
available
at
http:/ jwww.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/ pdf/judges_gender_region_040303.pdf (interfering that women
make up only about five percent of the total appointments).
100 Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 59, 2012, at 1. available at
http://www. vcc.columbia.edu/ content/ lack-women-arbitrators-investmenttreaty-arbitration ("In 249 known investment treaty cases until May 2010, there
were 631 appointments. Of these, 41 were appointments of women-just 6.5% of
all appointments. Worse, of the 247 individuals appointed as arbitrators across all
cases, only 10 were women. Women thus comprised 4% of those serving as
arbitrators. The story is also almost entirely that of two women, Gabrielle
Kaufmann-Kahler and Brigitte Stern, who together captured 75% of appointments
of women. In contrast, the two most frequently appointed men accounted for 5%
of the 593 appointments of male arbitrators."). See also Franck, Empirically
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when considering ICSID's more recent appointmentsJDl
Significantly, 75% of all female arbitrator appointments went to
two women; thus without counting their appointments, the
percentage of women arbitrators would be even lower.1D2 It is also
worth noting that, counter-intuitively, women account for only
3.49% of appointments made by the Chairman of the
Administrative Counsel of ICSID for all ad hoc annulment
committee members appointed since 2008_103
Additionally, few repeat players seem to dominate the field.
For example, almost 20% of all arbitrators selected in the cases
decided on the merits by ICSID in the 1994-2009 period were
appointed at least four times.104 Moreover, often repeat players
inter-change roles, acting both as counsel and arbitrators, which
compound their impact in the field.
These data give support to the concern expressed in recent
discussion as to whether, given the lack of diversity that results
from party-selection, the existing selection procedures result in the
selection of the best decision makers. 1D5 The lack of diversity
becomes more important as arbitrators are deciding more complex
and public policy cases, in which a wide variety of viewpoints
would be particularly beneficial.
Indeed, investment arbitration has fallen victim to its own
success, drawing criticism regarding the elitist and partial nature

Evaluating Claims, supra note 17, at 81 (commenting on the surprisingly small
number of women in arbitration relative to other similar professions).
1o1 C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Getting a Better Balance on International
Arbitration Tribunals, 27 ARB. INT'L 653, 655 (2012).
102 See Irene Ten Cate, Binders Full of Women ... Arbitrators?, INTLAWGRRLS,
(Nov. 2, 2012), http:/ fwww.intlawgrrls.com/2012/11/binders-full-of-womenarbitrators.html (reporting that Brigitte Stern was appointed 51.61% of the time
and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kahler 22.58%).
103 Id. ("One might expect to encounter more women in annulment
committees, whose members are appointed by the Chairman of the
Administrative Counsel of ICSID. After all, doesn't ICSID have greater incentives
than parties to consider gender balance? Perhaps not. Women account for only
3.49% of annulment committee members appointed since 2008.").
104 Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decisions
Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47,73 (2010).
105 Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 475 (stating that the perceived
shortcoming of investment arbitration - including the ad hoc appointment of
arbitrators -have led to call for the replacement or "radical redesign of investorstate dispute-settlement mechanisms").
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of the processJ06 Concerns about party-appointment of arbitrators
ultimately question whether existing selection procedures produce
the best decision makers.1D7 Suggestions to better international
investment arbitration should be carefully considered. However,
as I will explain next, the call for a drastic change in the selection
procedures is premature and is hardly warranted, given the fact
that there are other ways to strengthen the arbitrators' selection
procedures.
3.3. Responding to Criticisms: Why Party-Appointments Should
Remain

The combination of new data, intense criticism, increased
awareness, and practice of international investment arbitration has
resulted in a call for a reassessment and modification of the
practice of party-appointmentsJOS Despite criticisms by both
experts and practitioners, party-appointment is a sound choice for
international investment arbitration and should be maintained for
a number of reasons. Parties support it, and there are good policy
reasons to maintain it.
Additionally, there are procedural
safeguard in place to protect it from possible abuse, which could,
as proposed, be also further strengthened.

106 See e.g., PIA EBERHARDT & CECIUA OuvET, TRANSNAT'L INST. & CoRP. EuR.
OBSERVATORY, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND
FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), available at
http:/ j corporateeurope.org/ sites/ default/ files/publications/ profiting-frominjustice.pdf (arguing that a "small club of international law firms, arbitrators and
financial speculators are fuelling an investment arbitration boom that is costing
taxpayers billions of dollars and preventing legislation in the public interest").
107 Brower & Schill, supra note 4, at 474-475.
1os See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 7 (advocating for a method of
appointment of judges for a set term to make judges independent). See also
Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible?, supra note 90 (criticizing the
mechanism of appointment of arbitrators by party and suggesting possible
alternatives, including selection by a neutral institution or the use of list for the
appointment of all arbitrators, following the example of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport); Hans Smit, supra note 90 (stating that party-appointed arbitrators are
often unable to provide the objectivity demanded by the position). See generally
Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. L.
Inaugural Con£., Working Paper No. 22/08, 2008), available at http:/ jssm.com
/ abstract=l153424 and http:// dx.doi.org/10.2139 j ssrn.1153424 (arguing for an
alternative to the existing system of investment treaty arbitration measured
against criteria that normally apply in public law).
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3.3.1. There Are No Good Alternatives

International investment arbitration is the culmination of a
very delicate and carefully-negotiated process. As Professor
Michael Reisman eloquently notes, "[p]robably no arbitral
institution ... better captures the curious convergence of dissimilar
interests of governments, foreign investors and international
institutions than the Washington Agreement of 1965, which
produced the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes." 109 International investment arbitration offers a unique
and indispensable dispute resolution mechanism to resolve
disputes between a state and investor, and as such, it provides an
important and useful service to both investors and states.
The balance of interests achieved by the international
investment process, moreover, would be difficult to recreate in any
alternative situation. None of the recent proposals that call for a
change in the party-selection system provide a feasible alternative.
For example, Paulsson suggests that arbitrators should be either
selected by a neutral authority or should only be selected from a
pre-approved list.1 10 However, having a neutral authority select all
the arbitrators would change completely the balance of interests
negotiated by the parties, while not ensuring that the neutral
authority does not take into consideration the diverse interests
represented by each party. Similarly, selecting from a preapproved list would not guarantee the absence of biases any more
than the present system. Instead, it would only anticipate the
selection of preferred arbitrators by the party while further
restricting the number of available candidates.
Smit suggested that "party-appointed arbitrators should be
banned unless their role as advocates for the party that appointed
them is fully disclosed and accepted."111 However, while each
party is indeed fully aware of the role played by each arbitrator
and is cognizant of who selected whom, the role of arbitrator is

109 Reisman, supra note 22, at 236 (observing that "[p]robably no arbitral
institution in contemporary international arbitration better captures the curious
convergence of dissimilar interests of governments, foreign investors and
international institutions than the Washington Agreement of 1965, which
produced the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes").
no Paulsson, supra note 19, at 348.
m Smit, supra note 19, at 1.
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very different than that of an advocate, and is instead that of an
adjudicator.
Gus Van Harten suggests the creation of a permanent
international investment court.112 The reality is that it would be
just impossible to negotiate the creation of another permanent
court and to find the will and interest to negotiate the creation of a
new institution. Further, nominations of judges in international
courts are not simple, apolitical processes.113 The same balance of
different views will be found in a permanent investment court.
Complete overhaul of the system to eliminate party-appointed
arbitrators is also practically unfeasible. Changing the dispute
resolution clause would not only require a renegotiation of the
ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Model law, it would also
require the renegotiation and redrafting of the innumerable BITs
and investment protection treaties that include a dispute resolution
clause that provides for the selection by the parties and by a
neutral appointing authority.11 4 Realistically, moreover, as Veeder
suggests "the fact is that most institutions cannot at present be
trusted with any arbitral appointments not made with the prior
informed consent of all parties."m
Indeed, often, there is just "no alternative to arbitration."116
Judge 0. Thomas Johnson concludes:
[t]he alternative to compulsory investor-State arbitration is
either compulsory State-to-State arbitration, which requires
the claimant State either to take an adversarial posture with
respect to the host State or to leave its injured national

112 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 7, at 180-84 (arguing for a new method for
appointing judges). See generally Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International
Investment Court, supra note 103.
113 Mackenzie eta!., supra note 29.
114 Parties to investment arbitration have clarified their preference for
participating in the selection process of arbitrators, as this is of paramount
importance for the choice to go to arbitration. A change to permanent judiciary
would undermine the arbitration system.
115 V.V. Johnny Veeder, Inaugural International Arbitration Lecture in Honor
of Charles Brower, 107th ASIL Annual Meeting (Apr. 5, 2013).
116 David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the
Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 116
(1990) ("On the municipal level, arbitration is attractive because it is perceived to
a desirable alternative to the courts. But on the international level, there often is
no alternative to arbitration. In many international situations, neither party will
agree to submit all possible disputes to the courts of the other.").
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without a remedy, or direct diplomatic and/ or economic
intervention by the claimant State. It is difficult to imagine
a foreign minister of either a capital-importing or a capitalexporting country who would welcome any of these
alternatives.ll7
This system is needed because there is no other alternative
forum where parties agree to bring their international investment
disputes.
In the end, we may be just asking arbitrators to be impossibly
unaffected by the world around them, while also defining bias too
loosely. As Professor Susan Franck argues:
[m]odern international arbitration requires the objective
application of rules to facts and the exercise of bounded
discretion to ensure that the process and final outcome is
warranted.
While parties may pick arbitrators with
particular cultural and legal backgrounds and specific
personal experiences, arbitrators also generally have an
obligation to disclose those matters that would call into
question their independence. Although all humans are
inevitably influenced by their experiences, in international
arbitration, parties ask arbitrators to put aside biases in
order to fairly and impartially exercise their independent
judgment and apply their expertise to the facts on the
record to render a decision based upon the law. 118
That ability to fairly decide a dispute without being influenced
by external factors is the core ability of an international arbitrator.
At its core, international investment arbitration is a system that
combines aspects of international public law and commercial law
This system relies on partyto create a unique system.
appointment.
Getting rid of party appointment would
denaturalize the core of international investment arbitration and
transform it into a different system. As it is explained below, what
could initially be seen as a downside is indeed an upside for
international investment arbitration, because it provides a strong
117 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs: The
Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, 2010/2011 Y.B. ON INT'L
INVESTMENT L. & PoL'Y (Vale Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Int'l Inv., Karl P.
Sauvant ed.) 692.
ns Franck, supra note 37, at 505-07 (footnotes omitted).
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support to a voluntary system by all the main participants. Both
parties have a strong interest in upholding and respecting
decisions of an arbitral tribunal, which they played a part in
selecting.
3.3.2. Party Preference for Party-Appointments

The possibility of choosing their own arbitrators is a key reason
why parties, both investors and states, agree and elect to arbitrate.
Rogers notes that "[e]mpirical studies consistently verify that
parties' ability to select arbitrators is one of the primary reasons
they select arbitration as a means of dispute resolution." 119 In
October 2012, the School of International Arbitration at Queen
Mary, University of London and White & Case released the results
of the "2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and
Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process," a global survey on
practices in international arbitration which comprised responses
from more than 700 practitioners. 12o The survey showed that
seventy-six percent of respondents preferred selection of two coarbitrators by each party unilaterally in a three-member arbitral
tri bunal.121
While users' support is always important, it is particularly
relevant for international investment arbitration. International
investment arbitration seeks to find a solution in a dispute where
parties- a state and an investor- have diametrically different
interests. The fact that they could agree on a dispute resolution
system capable of converging and resolving such dissimilar
interests, and thus eventually in the resulting award, is an
achievement worth protecting.122
Rogers, supra note 27.
SCH. OF INT'L ARBITRATION AT QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON & WHITE &
CASE, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CURRENT AND PREFERRED
PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS 2 (2012), available at http:/ /arbitration.
practicallaw.com/6-522-2998. For a short overview and commentary on the
study, see John Templeman, The 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Looking
Behind the Closed Doors of International Arbitration, PRACTICAL L. Co. (Nov. 7, 2012),
http:/ f uk.practicallaw.com/ cs/Satellite/ about/5-522-2994.
121 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 120, at 2.
122 See Bjorklund, supra note 25, at 1300 ("The burgeoning emphasis on
transparency and public participation is at once a response to the public's
fascination with investment arbitration and a facilitator of that fascination;
international commercial arbitration, a largely private endeavor, has never
captured public interest to the same extent.").
119
120
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As Professor Andreas Lowenfeld explains "one of the principal
functions of a party-appointed arbitrator is to give confidence in
the process to the parties and their counsel . . . . "123 Partyappointed arbitrators are nominated with the expectation that they
understand the party's position and they may be well predisposed
to it.124 This must not, and does not, equate to bias.m Parties make
a selection and appoint an arbitrator who is 'philosophically'
inclined to decide along the views of the claimant or of the
respondent. Thus, an arbitrator does not decide in a certain way
because of the specific appointment by a party, but because he or
she shares the same Weltanschauung as the party that appointed
them. This also explains (and justifies) the time and money spent
on the selection of arbitrators and the propensity for repeated (and
safer) appointments.126 A well-prepared party can ensure that he
or she selects an arbitrator that has a certain predisposition to
issues that are important to the appointing party. 127 As Claudia
Salomon advises when choosing an arbitrator, parties should
"[c]hoose [a]n [i]mpartial, [b]ut [k]nown
[p]arty-[a]ppointed
[a]rbitrator."12s

123 See Lowenfeld, supra note 43, at 62 ("Sometimes that confidence can be
based on mutual acquaintances, without direct personal contact; some potential
arbitrators become well-known through published writings, lectures, committee
work, or public office. Others are not so well known, and I understand that
lawyers or clients or both want to have a firsthand look. I think, however, some
restraint should be shown by both sides.").
124 See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 58 ARBITRATION 219,
223 (1987) ("[W]hen I am representing a client in an arbitration, what I am really
looking for in a party-nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum
predisposition towards my client, but with the minimum appearance of bias.").
12s Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 56 (2005) ("[T]he
mirage of absolute judicial impartiality becomes more distorted when it is
superimposed onto the arbitrator.").
126 Rogers highlights the importance, in this context, of information
asymmetry and advocates for the creation of an "Arbitrators Information Project"
to provide information related to arbitrators to both parties equally. Catherine A.
Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http:/ /digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/
globalevents/ investment/ symposia/3.
127 See Hunter, supra note 124.
128 Claudia T. Salomon, Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to
Consider, MEALEYS INT'L ARB. REP., Oct. 2002, at 2, available at
http:/ jwww.arbitralwomen.org/filesjpublication/0405202743129.pdf.
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A case that is often cited as a demonstration of a possible
arbitrator bias is Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States.129 The case
involved a Canadian inventor who brought a case under NAFTA
against the United States for denial of justice by Mississippi courts,
which had found against him in a $3 million transaction and
awarded $400 million in punitive damages and $75 million for
emotional distress.130 Loewen was unable to appeal because he did
not have sufficient funds to post the $625 million bond required
(125% of the judgment).131 The case bankrupted the Canadian
company.132 The NAFTA Tribunal found that "the conduct of the
trial judge was so flawed as to constitute a miscarriage of justice"
but denied jurisdiction over Loewen for lack of nationality.133 In a
symposium held after the award was made public, the arbitrator
that the Respondent had appointed, a federal judge, recounted that
he had met officials of the U.S. Department of Justice prior to
accepting the appointment; the officials had told him that, if the
United States lost the case, "we could lose NAFTA." 134 The
arbitrator remembered replying "[w]ell, if you want to put
pressure on me, then that does it."Bs
At first reading, this case appears very troubling because it
seems to demonstrate that pressure was exercised towards one of
the arbitrators, who seemed to be inclined to give in to the
pressure. On a deeper analysis, however, we may be reading too
much into the reported discussion, especially because it is
interpreted with the knowledge of how the case was finally
disposed, which has been widely criticized.136 In fact, the
arbitrator's narration shows that the party interviewed him prior to
the selection as the arbitrator.137 There are no suggestions of

129 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Award Gune 26, 2003).
130 Id. ~~ 3-4.
131 Id. ~~5-6.
132 Id. ~ 29.
133 Id. ~ 54, ~~ 234-36. For a detailed analysis of the Loewen case, see Jan
Paulsson, Inaugural Lecture, supra note 90.
134 Paulsson, supra note 90, at 6.
135 Id.
136 For a thoughtful discussion of this case, see Veeder, supra note 115. See
also V. V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three
Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747, 755 (1998).
137 Veeder, supra note 115.
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improper discussion with the Department of Justice after his
appointment to the panel. Moreover, although the U.S. arbitrator
was privy to the general knowledge about the Loewen case's
importance to the future of NAFTA, he did not seem to discuss any
of the specifics of the case. The arbitrator's reply was similarly
general and non-committal.
What the case does show, however, is that what may seem
normal to a U.S. practitioner, namely the pre-appointment meeting
of counsel with possible arbitrators, may seem objectionable to a
non-U.S. practitioner. The different ethics standards and the lack
of guidance thereof is an important issue. As I will explain below,
it should be properly addressed in order to strengthen investment
arbitration.
Another recent decision rejecting an arbitrator's challenge
highlights the difficulties in assessing behavior and reinforces the
need for more guidance on ethical issues. In Urbaser S.A. v. The
Argentine Republic, the remaining two members of an ICSID
Tribunal were called upon to decide a challenge by Argentina
based on academic writings of the challenged arbitrator, which
Argentina claimed had demonstrated a pre-judgment of certain
important issues.BB The Tribunal concluded that:
No arbitrator and, more generally, no human being of a
certain age is, in absolute terms, independent and impartial.
Simply put, every individual is conveying ideas and
opinions based on its moral, cultural, and professional
education and experience. What is required, when it comes
to rendering judgment in a legal dispute, is the ability to
consider and evaluate the merits of each case, without
relying on factors having no relation to such merits,139
International investment arbitration is a complex system where
actors are sophisticated. Manifest or obvious bias will be very
rarely found. The requirement of an absolute tabula rasa for
arbitrators may just be unachievable. All decision-makers have
their own experiences and ideas, which inform their decision. This

138 Urbaser S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07 /26,
Decision on Claimants' Proposal to Disqualify Professor Campbell McLachlan,
Arbitrator, ~ 40 (Aug. 12, 2010).
139 Id. ~~ 20-25.
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does not result in biased decisions, however_140 Sacerdoti notes
that:
Empirical evidence from the rejection of most
disqualification requests confirms that the great majority of
arbitrators are serious professionals who take care and
pride in being independent and impartial. If a partyappointed arbitrator is biased he or she will end up in the
minority. On the other hand, there is nothing wrong if such
an arbitrator shares in good faith the position of the party
who has made the appointment.141
Experienced arbitrators have no difficulties evaluating the
merits of each case and will disregard other factors that have no
bearing with the merits of the case. Arbitrators are not agents of
the parties that appointed them, but rather are adjudicators who
have to decide the dispute fairly.142
A party preference for a system, of course, is not by itself
sufficient to maintain a system if it is faulty. In addition to parties'
preferences, there are other important reasons to support partyappointment of arbitrators.
3.3.3. Party-appointment is an Essential Element of International

Investment Arbitration
Another key argument in favor of party-appointment relies on
the very nature of international investment arbitration as a dispute
resolution process that is distinct from adjudication by
permanent- either
domestic
or
international- courts.143
140 Id. ~ 40. For example, compare the discussions about the experience and
political views of Supreme Court Justices, which inform their decisions but do not
condition them.
141 Giorgio Sacerdoti, Is
the Party-Appointed Arbitrator a "Pernicious
Institution"? A Reply to Professor Hans Smit, COLUM. FDI PERSP., no. 35, 2011, at 1,
available at http:/ jwww.vcc.columbia.edu/ content/ party-appointed-arbitratorpernicious-institution-reply-professor-hans-smit.
142 Id. (writing that rather than being "agents of the parties appointing them,"
arbitrators are "trustees").
143 See BLACKABY, ET AL., supra note 84, at 313 (2009) ("An arbitral tribunal
established to determine an international commercial dispute operates in an
entirely different context from a judge sitting irl a national court. Judges sit irl a
legal environment that clearly defines the extent of their powers and duties. They
are generally given full immunity in respect of any potential liability arising out of
the conduct of their judicial function. Their jurisdiction, and the extent to which
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Arbitration is a more neutral setting than what is found in
international or domestic courts of either the investor or the State.
Indeed, the importance of depoliticizing investment disputes was
among the factors that prompted the creation of ICSID-an
international forum where such disputes could be brought.144
International arbitration, moreover, allows parties to agree on
basic issues of applicable law, jurisdiction, language, and
procedural rules. The selection of arbitrators, and the possibility of
selecting an arbitrator that has specific characteristics of expertise,
education, language capacity, or background, is a fundamental
feature of international investment arbitration and part and parcel
of the parties' autonomy.t45 In tum, the parties' trust in the process
makes their eventual enforcement of the award more likely.
The suggested radical change to a selection procedure that
eliminates party-appointed arbitrators would undermine the
arbitration system and erode parties' support for arbitration in the
first place.146 Indeed, a party's traditional right to appoint an
arbitrator is, as distinguished arbitrator V.V. Veeder said, "a genie

decisions in relation to jurisdiction may be reviewed by an appellate court, are
clearly established in the law governing the proceedings. The position differs in
arbitration, particularly in international arbitration, where the powers, duties, and
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal arise from a complex mixture of the will of the
parties, the law governing the arbitration agreement, the law of the place of
arbitration, and the law of the place where recognition or enforcement of the
award may be sought.").
144 See Waibel & Wu, supra note 11, at 2 ("Investors sometimes bring large
claims in relation to the budgets of the respondent states, in many cases
developing countries. The findings of the tribunal may require major adjustment
to public policy.").
145 See Joseph M. Matthews, Difficult Transitions Do Not Always Require Major
Adjustment- It's Not Time to Abandon Party-Nominated Arbitrators in Investment
Arbitration, 25 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 356, 359 (2010) (finding that
the roles of arbitrators in investment arbitration are: 1. to seek the truth about
what happened; 2. to set specific reasonable expectations for the parties and to
reject unreasonable ones; 3. to help along a fair finding of the fact and the law; and
4. to maintain overall confidence in the arbitral tribunal).
146 Note that parties' preference for appointing one arbitrator is rooted in the
history of international arbitration. In fact, the first modern international
arbitration involving States arose out of the 1794 Jay Treaty between the United
Kingdom and the newly independent United States. The treaty provided for the
establishment of several commissions consisting of one or two
commissioners/ arbitrators nominated by the each party, with the third or fifth
commissioner being chosen by agreement of the parties or by drawing lots. See
REED ET AL., supra note 44, at 65-66.
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that cannot easily be put back into the bottle." 147 Once the parties
are given the choice, it would be virtually impossible to reverse
course.
3.3.4. Procedural Safeguards Exist to Protect the System

Additionally, by and large, there are several official and
unofficial tools to ensure that choice of an arbitrator by the parties
is fair and not abused.1 48 First, rules of procedure of the selected
institutions provide the initial guideposts that monitor the
selection of arbitrators by the parties. 149 The rules set limits on
party autonomy and require arbitrators to possess certain
threshold qualities. The nationality requirement, which bars
parties from selecting arbitrators who are their nationals, is a good
example of a guidepost. Further, arbitrators are required to
generally be impartial and independent. They must disclose
situations giving rise to potential conflicts of interest, and make
sworn statements declaring that they will judge "fairly as between
the parties."lso If and when the rules are insufficient to guarantee
that the arbitration selection process works, they should be
amended as necessary, which is argued and elaborated in the next
section of this article.
In addition to explicit procedural rules, unwritten checks and
balances also preserve the independence and neutrality of
arbitrators.1s1 Primarily, arbitrators face reputational costs if they
V.V. Vedeer, Inaugural Lecture in Honor of Charles Brower, supra note 115.
148 BLACKABY Er AL., supra note 143, at 313-14 (describing well the challenge
arguing that a "balance must be struck between the sanctions that may be
imposed on arbitrators who carry out their functions in a careless or improper
manner, and the equally necessary requirement that an arbitral tribunal should be
able to perform its task without consistently 'looking over its shoulder' in fear of
being challenged through legal process. On one view, it may be argued that
arbitrators should be given virtually unlimited powers, in order to adapt the
process to the dispute in question and encourage speed and effectiveness in the
arbitral process; but the requirement of public policy, whether national or
international, make some control necessary so as to ensure that the parties are not
without recourse if there is wrongful conduct on the part of an arbitral tribunal.
In particular, it is considered critical that an arbitral tribunal give the parties a fair
hearing and that it decide only matters within its competence, or jurisdiction")
(footnotes omitted).
149 Sacerdoti, supra note 141.
150 ICSID RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS RULE 6 (2006).
151 See Franck, supra note 37, at 516-18 (arguing that there are three different
market forces which can remedy arbitrators' misconduct: 1. professional word of
147
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demonstrate lack of independence or impartiality.152 International
arbitrators are selected by parties or neutral appointing authorities
after much vetting and thought, and rely intensely on their
reputation for thoughtfulness and fair judgment in order to be
selected.
An arbitrator who gains a reputation for supporting the
positions of the party that appointed him or her will quickly
become ineffective and will not be re-appointed.153 First, sjhe will
become ineffective as a member of the arbitral tribunal because the
other two arbitrators on the Tribunal will identify and sideline an
arbitrator if he or she 'acts as counsel.' An arbitrator who is
perceived as biased has less power in deliberations.154 Second, a
non-neutral arbitrator will not be appointed to sit in future
arbitrations.1ss Indeed, Charles Brower calls the party-selection of
arbitrators the "ultimate meritocracy" because an arbitrator's
behavior is continuously scrutinized for potential appointments
and "he is somewhere in the world always up for re-election."l56
mouth in the arbitration marketplace; 2. market-based incentives which can create
financial incentives to behave appropriately; and 3. institutional incentives that
can establish certain consequences for improper conduct).
152 See e.g. Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, supra note 37, at 974
(stating that "[r]eputational sanctions are another form of control frequently
proposed as an alternative to formal regulation" and arguing that this may not be
sufficient given the information asymmetries that exist in the system).
153 See Lowenfeld, supra note 43, at 60 (arguing that overzealous partyappointed arbitrators lose credibility with the other members of the tribunal).
154 See Swigart, supra note 63, at 229 ("[O]ne current [ICJ] judge ad hoc,
speaking confidentially, lamented that, in fact, members of the regular bench
assume that he is biased in favor of the state that appointed him and consequently
do not take his views seriously. He added that other judges ad hoc in his
acquaintance have felt the same way- their colleagues on the bench do not value
their views and draft judgments.").
155 See Franck, Role of International Arbitrators, supra note 37, at 516-17 ("The
internal arbitrator marketplace, where professional credibility and word-of-mouth
recommendations affect appointment and re-appointment of arbitrators, plays a
significant role. Arbitrators can earn hundreds of thousands of dollars from a
single arbitration and gain personal prestige from having been involved in
significant case. For those 'repeat-players,' reputation and credibility as a fair,
independent and reasoned decision maker is vital. In multimillion and multibillion dollar disputes, parties are likely to be unwilling to appoint an arbitrator
who is likely to be challenged, who cannot fully consider fully the facts and laws
at issue and who may be incapable of rendering an enforceable award.")
(footnotes omitted).
156 Judge Charles N. Brower, Remarks at the Leading Figures in International
Dispute Resolution Series- The Future Of International Arbitration: Is The Past
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What is more, certain group dynamics are common and
intrinsic. Complex decision-making by an arbitral tribunal does
not differ substantially from group decisions by permanent judges
or by other groups of decision-makers.157
An experienced
president of the arbitral tribunal will know how to manage the
discussion. He or she will spot a non-neutral arbitrator fast, and
will take that into consideration and act accordingly during
deliberations. This is one of the reasons why the choice of the
president of the arbitral tribunal is a fundamental one for the
parties,158
Further, each party appoints an arbitrator. Thus, each party is
equally represented during the proceedings and deliberation.
There is a presumption of equality of arms.
During the
proceedings, an arbitrator may want to assist the tribunal with
understanding the view of the party that appointed him or her. An
arbitrator who does that excessively, however, will quickly
undermine his or her power during deliberations.
Ultimately, moreover, an arbitrator who is not impartial and
independent can be challenged during the proceedings. An award
that is given by an impartial arbitrator can be submitted to
challenge and annulment review .159 It is therefore of fundamental
importance, as will be seen below, that challenge procedures are
fair, effective, and expeditious.
In sum, the investment arbitration system is not in need of the
complete transformation that eliminating party-appointment
would bring. The appointment of arbitrators by the parties is
justified and is an indispensable part of its process. In the great
majority of cases, parties endorse an arbitration result and
willingly enforce awards, which ultimately demonstrates
arbitration success.
When parties are not satisfied, mechanisms of appeal and
redress exist as further protections. There is no need for a major
overall reform of international investment arbitration to eliminate
party-appointed arbitrators. Rather, it is possible to build a better
Prologue? Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals, AM. Soc. OF INT'L L.
Gan. 17, 2013), http://www.asil.org/conversation-judge-charles-n-brower-futureinternational-arbitration.
157 Rogers, supra note 126.
158 Id.
159 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 52.
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system by strengthening the existing rules. Two proposals to
enhance the international investment system are discussed below.
4.

STRENGTHENING ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCEDURES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

Investment arbitration has proven to be a reliable, efficient
mechanism to resolve complex international disputes. Now that
the reasons to preserve party-appointment of arbitrators have been
laid out, it is necessary to also address the specific criticisms of lack
of diversity and innate bias to minimize their downsides. These
important questions are addressed in this section.
The need is to recalibrate and make targeted adjustments to a
system that otherwise works.t6o
Necessary changes can be
obtained by, first, adopting different challenges rules to arbitrator
selection and by, second, modifying the arbitrator selection
mechanisms to ensure diversity.

4.1. Ensuring Impartiality (and Legitimacy) By Adopting Different
Challenge Rules
As discussed above, critics express concerns that partyappointments of arbitrators may lead arbitrators to harbor bias. I
have assessed above the safeguards that exist during the selection
process to guarantee the appointment of qualifies arbitrators. It is
also important to ensure that similar safeguards exist if one of the
parties questions the impartiality of an appointed arbitrator.
If a party believes that one of the appointed arbitrators lacks
the qualities required to perform the function of arbitrator and is
biased or partial, robust challenge procedures must exist. Strong
challenge procedures not only address and resolve parties'
concerns, but also consolidate the arbitrators' selection system and
generally strengthen international investment arbitration as an
effective dispute resolution option.
Existing challenge procedures are not always effective. This is
particularly true under the ICSID rules. Indeed, ICSID challenge
procedures are deficient both procedurally and in terms of the
applicable threshold for challenge. First, under ICSID procedure,
decisions on disqualification proposals are taken by the remaining
members of the Tribunal, or, in the case of a proposal to disqualify
160

Rogers, supra note 125.
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the sole arbitrator or majority of the arbitrators, by the
Chairman.161 Second, challenge proposals must be based on a
"manifest lack of [the] qualities" that are required to serve as an
arbitrator, a standard hard to meet. Cumulatively, these two
requirements make the threshold for a successful challenge very
difficult and are, in practice, ineffective. Indeed, of the thirty
disqualification proposals so far decided according to ICSID
procedures, all were dismissed but one.162 Additionally, in ICSID
arbitration "no arbitrator has ever been disqualified by the other
members of the tribunal."163
Under the normal ICSID proceedings, when one arbitrator is
challenged, the two remaining members of the Tribunal sit in
judgment of the challenge of the third member of the arbitral
tribunal, as it happened in the recent Decision on the Proposal to
Disqualify an Arbitrator in ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela.l64 The
challenge was brought by Venezuela after claimant-appointed
arbitrator informed the Secretary General of ICSID of certain facts
related to a forthcoming merger of his firm with a firm that acted
against Venezuela in the past, and of which he had just learned.16S
The regular ICSID proceeding was thus suspended until the
challenge was resolved. The remaining members of the Tribunal
asked both parties and the challenged arbitrator to comment on the
challenge and finally rejected it.J66
161 ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 58 ("The decision on any proposal
to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be taken by the other members of the
Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members
are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole conciliator or
arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or arbitrators, the Chairman shall take
that decision. If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded the conciliator or
arbitrator to whom the decision relates shall be replaced in accordance with the
provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or Section 2 of Chapter IV."). See also id., at
r. 9 (detailing the procedure for disqualifying an arbitrator).
162 KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 84 (2012).

Id.
ConocoPhillips Company v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/30, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify L. Yves Fortier, Q.C.,
Arbitrator (Feb. 27, 2012), available at http:/ /icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
Index.jsp.
165 Judge Kenneth Keith of the International Court of Justice and Professor
Georges Abi-Saab.
166 Abaclat
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Recommendation Pursuant to the Request by ICSID on the Respondent's Proposal
163
164
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In terms of the threshold standard required to win a challenge,
the ICSID Convention provides that a party may propose the
disqualification of an arbitrator" on account of any fact indicating a
manifest lack of the qualities" required to be nominated.167 This
standard of review was used in ICSID Decision on the Proposal to
Disqualify an Arbitrator in ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela. In this case,
a few days after the proceedings were suspended, the challenger's
arbitrator informed the parties and the Tribunal members that he
had resigned from his firm. 168 He also confirmed that an ethics
screen was established and would be maintained until his
departure. 169 In its pleadings, Venezuela argued, however, that
several facts constituted "a circumstance that might cause [an
arbitrator's] reliability for independent judgment to be questioned
by a party." 170
Venezuela asserted its objection was "not
for the Disqualification of [Arbitrator] (Dec. 19, 2011). Note that, under ICSID
Rules, when the sole arbitrator is challenged, or when the majority of the
arbitrators are challenged, it is for a neutral authority to decide on the challenge.
Decisions are normally taken by the Chairman of the Administrative Council of
the World Bank, but are also at times referred to a neutral authority, like the
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
167 See ICSID Convention, supra note 31, at art. 57 (noting that the necessary
"qualities" are listed in paragraph (1) of Article 14 and adding that "[a] party to
arbitration proceedings may, in addition, propose the disqualification of an
arbitrator on the ground that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal
under Section 2 of Chapter IV."). See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 49,
at r. 9 (detailing the procedure to be taken: "(1) A party proposing the
disqualification of an arbitrator pursuant to Article 57 of the Convention shall
promptly, and in any event before the proceeding is declared closed, file its
proposal with the Secretary-General, stating its reasons therefor. (2) The
Secretary-General shall forthwith: (a) transmit the proposal to the members of the
Tribunal and, if it relates to a sole arbitrator or to a majority of the members of the
Tribunal, to the Chairman of the Administrative Council; and (b) notify the other
party of the proposal. (3) The arbitrator to whom the proposal relates may,
without delay, furnish explanations to the Tribunal or the Chairman, as the case
may be. (4) Unless the proposal relates to a majority of the members of the
Tribunal, the other members shall promptly consider and vote on the proposal in
the absence of the arbitrator concerned. If those members are equally divided,
they shall, through the Secretary -General, promptly notify the Chairman. of the
proposal, of any explanation furnished by the arbitrator concerned and of their
failure to reach a decision. (5) Whenever the Chairman has to decide on a
proposal to disqualify an arbitrator, he shall use his best efforts to take that
decision within 30 days after he has received the proposal. (6) The proceeding
shall be suspended until a decision has been taken on the proposal.").
168 ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, ~ 11.
169 Id.
170 Id. ~~ 23-25 (change in original).
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predicated on any actual lack of independence or impartiality, but
on apprehension of the appearance of impropriety."m In contrast,
ConocoPhillips argued a disqualification must be based on facts
that demonstrate "a manifest lack of the required qualities" in an
arbitrator.172
The Tribunal found the applicable legal standard was provided
in Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, and stated that a party may
propose the disqualification of any tribunal member for "manifest
lack of the qualities" required to sit as an arbitrator, namely a
"high moral character" and the capacity to "exercise independent
judgment." 173 The Tribunal also remarked that the term "manifest"
in Article 57 means "'obvious' or 'evident' and highly probable,
not just possible."1 74 Applying the "manifest" standard, the
Tribunal dismissed the challenge.175
Regardless of the specific merits of any case, having the
remaining arbitrators decide a challenge to a fellow arbitrator is
improper and puts the remaining arbitrators in a difficult and
uneasy position. Arbitrators are still selected from a small group
of qualified individuals and most know each other and have longstanding professional relationships. Asking arbitrators to judge
171 Id. '1[31, at 10 (stating Venezuela's argument that the case does not revolve
around the possibility of lack of independence but on the apprehensions of
appearance of impropriety).
172 Id. 'If 35, at 16 (stating that the Tribunal noted that Respondent had
refereed to General Standard 7(c) of the IBA Guidelines, stating that "[a]n
arbitrator is under a duty to make reasonable enquiries to investigate any
potential conflict of interest, as well as any facts or circumstances that may cause
his or her impartiality of independence to be questioned. Failure to disclose a
potential conflict is not excused by lack of knowledge if the arbitrator makes no
reasonable attempt to investigate.").
173 Id. 'If 51, at 16 (mentioning that the Convention provides in art. 14(1) that
the members of the panel have to be of high moral character).
174 Id. 'If 56. The Tribunal noted that article 57 states that the term "manifest"
means "obvious" and this standard "imposes a relatively heavy burden on the
party proposing disqualification." Id.
175 Id. '1['1[64-65 (noting that the Tribunal had no reason to doubt Mr. Fortier's
statements that he "had not been involved in any way in the negotiation, that he
had not taken part in or been privy to the plans for the international arbitration
group in the combined firm, that he had no knowledge of any file, if any exists, on
which lawyers from the two firms had been working together and he
'categorically' stated that he had no involvement in any such file, nor had he been
made privy to any information about any such file."). This denial implies that his
high moral character and capacity to exercise independent judgment were thus
not called into question.
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challenges of a person with whom they likely have and will
continue to have professional relations is improper.
Further, the threshold adopted by tribunals does not properly
address concerns that may arise relating to party-appointed
arbitrators who are perceived as being excessively inclined to
decide in favor of the party that appointed them. This is
particularly true for repeat appointments. A revision of the ICSID
challenge procedure would significantly alleviate the inherent
biases concern. The example set in the UNCITRAL Rules is a step
in the right direction.
The 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that any
arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to
"justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or
independence."176 The UNCITRAL threshold is different and
would allow more meaningful review of the facts that lead to the
challenge. Further, challenges under UNCITRAL Rules are to be
decided by the appointing authority, and not by the remaining
members of the Tribunal.177
For example, the Decision on the Challenge of an Arbitrator in
Vito G. Gallo v. Canada was taken under UNCITRAL Rules,178 In
this case, the claimant filed a challenge after learning that the
professional situation of the arbitrator appointed by Respondent
had changed since the commencement of the arbitration. At the
time of his appointment, the challenged arbitrator was in the
process of joining a large Canadian law firm as an independent
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), supra note 31, at art. 12, 10(1).
Id. at art. 13(4) (stating that "[i)f, within 15 days from the date of the notice
of challenge, all parties do not agree to the challenge or the challenged arbitrator
does not withdraw, the party making the challenge may elect to pursue it. In that
case, within 30 days from the date of the notice of challenge, it shall seek a
decision on the challenge by the appointing authority"). The prior UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules 1976 adopted the same general method. Article 12 provides:
176

177

the decision on the challenge will be made: (a) [w]hen the initial
appointment was made by an appointing authority, by that authority; (b)
[w]hen the initial appointment was not made by an appointing
authority, but an appointing authority has been previously designated,
by that authority; (c) [i]n all other cases, by the appointing authority to
be designated in accordance with the procedure for designating an
appointing authority as provided for in article 6.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), supra note 42, at art. 12(1).
178 Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Decision on the
Challenge to Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, QC (Oct. 14, 2009).
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consultant to focus on serving as an arbitrator. 179 In this new role,
he subsequently agreed to advise Mexico on legal matters, which
could include international investment arbitration.1so The case was
filed with the ICSID Deputy Secretary-General, who acted as the
appointing authority in the case.181 The Deputy Secretary General
heard comments from all parties and eventually determined that
the arbitrator would have to choose between continuing to provide
legal advice to Mexico or serving as an arbitrator in the case.182
The Deputy Secretary-General examined the situation and
clarified that the applicable standard under UNCITRAL arbitration
rules was an objective one.183 In his view, the potential for conflict
in this case lay in the fact that Mexico under NAFTA could
participate in the proceedings (as non-disputing parties) on
questions of interpretation of NAFTA. 184 He therefore clarified that
"from the point of view of a 'reasonable and informed third party'
... there would be justifiable doubts about [the arbitrator's]
impartiality and independence ... if he were not to discontinue his
advisory services to Mexico for the remainder of this
arbitration." 1ss The arbitrator resigned from the arbitration seven
days later_186
The comparisons above demonstrate that UNCITRAL Rules
provide a better challenge procedure because a neutral authority
Id. ~~ 6-7.
Id. ~ 8.
181 Id. ~~ 2-3.
182 Id. ~ 36.
183 Id.
184 Id. ~ 36.
185 Id.
186 In another interesting case, ICS Inspection & Control Services Ltd. v. The
Republic of Argentina, Decision on Challenge to Mr. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, the
challenge of an arbitrator was upheld by the appointing authority chosen by the
Secretary-General of PCA under the UNCITRAL Rules.
See generally ICS
Inspection & Control Services Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL,
Decision on Challenge to Mr. Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Arbitrator (Dec. 17, 2009).
In the case, Argentina challenged Mr. Alexandrov, the arbitrator appointed by
claimant, claiming that he and his law firm's concurrent representation in a
separate, long-running case against Argentina gave rise to justifiable doubts as to
the arbitrator's independence and impartiality. Id. In making his decision
upholding the challenge, the appointing authority referred to the IBA Guidelines
and found that the facts underlying Mr. Alexandrov's disclosure were reflected in
scenarios set forth in the Guidelines. Id. The appointing authority concluded that
the conflict was sufficiently serious to give rise to objectively justifiable doubts as
to Mr. Alexandrov's impartiality and independence. Id.
179
180
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resolves challenges and the threshold is different, reqmrmg a
"justifiable doubt" standard. To ensure legitimacy of its decisions
and a wider support of international investment arbitration, ICSID
should also move towards asking a neutral tribunal to decide on
challenges, based on a different threshold. This change can only be
made through an amendment of the ICSID Convention. Though it
would be very difficult to negotiate, it is necessary if we wish to
maintain the success of the international investment arbitration
system and support of all parties involved_IB7
It is also important to note that most tribunals refer to the
International Bar Association's Guidelines on Conflict of Interests
in International Arbitration to assess challenges, and specifically
the existence of a conflict.1BB These Guidelines are particularly
important because they are detailed and offer a viable framework
to decide on the existence of a conflict. Moreover, because they
refer to the point of view of a "reasonable and informed third
party," they also offer a clear angle to be used by tribunals.JB9
Their continued and more frequent use by tribunals operating
under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules is desirable. Indeed, it
would be useful if parties specifically agree to use the IBA
Guidelines at the outset of the arbitral proceedings.
The importance of adopting common rules to strengthen the
arbitrator selection system cannot be overestimated. It will give
the parties clear guidance and predictability when selecting
international arbitrators. It will also allow arbitrators to adopt
uniform and clear behavior, and send a strong signal to the general
public that their concerns are fully taken into consideration.
4.2. Ensuring Diversity (and Legitimacy) By Enlarging the Pool of

Arbitrators
An important criticism recognized empirically is the lack of
diversity - both geographic and gender - of those who are selected
as arbitrators. Thus, a second important measure that can be taken
187 On this issue, see Chiara Giorgetti, Challenges of International Investment
Arbitrators - How it Works, and Does it Work?, 7 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 303
(2013).
188 COUNCIL OF THE INT'L BAR Ass'N, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFUCf OF INTEREST
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004), available at http:/ jwww.ibanet.org/
Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx.
189 Id. at 8.
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to strengthen the international arbitration system is to enlarge the
pool of arbitrators. More arbitrators from outside Europe and
North America, and more women are needed.
In fact, though the numbers of international arbitration cases
has increased in recent years, the group of arbitrators selected by
parties to decide their cases is still small. This means that often the
same persons are appointed. Moreover, instances exist where the
same person may act as counsel in a case and as arbitrator in
another case. These situations lead to criticism of the arbitration
system. Additionally, the lack of diversity seen together with the
increased use of arbitration will inevitably result in more real or
perceived conflicts by selected arbitrators and thus in more
challenges by the parties_190 Indeed, non-party stakeholders also
identify lack of diversity as a cause of concern.t91
As arbitration is based on the freedom of the party, it may
sound counterintuitive, or even contradictory, to guide a party's
choice as a way to strengthen investment arbitration. However, as
the number of cases increases, a larger pool of arbitrators will also
result in expedited proceedings and fewer challenges of arbitrators
during the proceedings.
It is widely accepted both at domestic and international levels
that "a diverse judiciary is an indispensable requirement of any
democracy."t92 Indeed, the need for geographical representation is
even more important in the international dispute resolution
setting.t93 Chief Justice McLachlin of Canada argued specifically
that a better gender balance between female and male judges
190 See Jeremy K. Sharpe, Introductory Note to the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted
Under Annex Vll of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Republic
of Mauritius v. United Kingdom & Northern Ireland, Reasoned Decision on Challenge, 51
I.L.M. 350, 351 (2012) (highlighting "the complications that can arise when the
arbitrator plays multiple roles, including as counsel, adviser, or international
judge").
191 EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 106 (describing the community of
arbitrators as "'small, secret, clubby,' 'an inner circle,' 'a closed homogenous
group comprised of grand old men' ... 'or even an arbitration mafia"') (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
192 Centre for Int'I Cts. & Tribunals, Selecting International Judges: Principle,
Process and Politics 37 (University College London, Discussion Paper, 2008),
available
at
http:/ /www.ucl.ac.uk/lawsjcictjdocs/Selecting_Int_Judges.pdf
(quoting Lady Hale, The Appointment and Removal of Judges: Independence and
Diversity, International Association of Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference
(May 3-7, 2006)).
193 Id.
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would better reflect the composition of our society, and thus more
women judges would increase the legitimacy of the courts, reflect
the commitment to equality of our society, best use available
human capital, bring a new perspective, and route out rooted
stereotypes.194
The same can be said in support of other types of diversity.
Indeed, diversity is beneficial for several reasons. First, diversity
brings more points of views in deliberation so that a more
comprehensive understanding of the parties' position is granted.
Thus, diversity brings better judgments.
Second, diversity
enhances legitimacy because a more diverse tribunal better mirrors
the composition of society. Hence, diversity also results in
stronger judgments. Importantly, as international investment cases
increasingly touch on public policy matters, it becomes particularly
important to include multiple and diverse point of views within
the persons that decide disputes.
To ensure that diversity is enhanced within the party-guided
system that characterizes international investment arbitration,
efforts should concentrate on voluntary measures. First, several
actions to enlarge the pool of arbitrators can be taken directly by
the neutral appointing authorities when making selection. Second,
the parties can also play a role in reaching that goal.
4.2.1. Actions By Appointing Authorities and Secretariats

The neutral authorities that participate in the selection of
arbitrators can directly adopt several targeted measures to directly
enhance diversity, and, at different stages in the proceedings, do
not require any specific mandate by Member States. First and
foremost, appointing authorities should promote diversity when
they select presiding and co-arbitrators or members of ad hoc
annulment committees.
Specifically, for example, the
Administrative Council Chairman, the ICSID Secretary General
and the PCA Secretary General should, whenever possible, include

194 See Mary-Ann Hedlund & Susan Glazebrook, Foreward, in THE IAWJ:
TWENTY YEARS OF JUDGING FOR EQUAUTY 2, 3 (Mary-Ann Hedlund, Susan
Glazebrook, Arline Pacht & Jill Wainwright eds., 2010), available at
www.iawj.org/JUBILEE_BOOK_IAWJ_WEBSITE_FINAL_1_.pdf (stating that in a
world where one of the primary functions of the judiciary is to promote equality,
it would be anomalous to exclude women from being a part of it). See also Van
Harten, supra note 100.
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new and diverse candidates on the lists of three candidates given
to the parties for selection.
Second, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council can
more specifically further diversity when exercising his or her right
in selecting the ten members of the Panel of Arbitrators. In his last
selection in 2012, the Chairman designated only three women out
of tenJ95
This is not sufficient.
Though other diversity
requirements were considered, more must be done at the
institution level.
Third, ICSID' s Secretary General should urge ICSID
Contracting States to nominate arbitrators to the ICSID Panel of
Arbitrators with the objective of advancing diversity. Each
Contracting State has a Convention right to nominate four people,
who do not necessarily have to be nationals of the nominating
State, to the Panel of ArbitratorsJ96 Members of the Arbitrator
Panels are important: if the parties fail to agree on who to
nominate as the presiding arbitrators, the Chairman of the
Administrative Council must select the members of the panel to
make the nomination. Panel members are also used to nominate
members of ad hoc annulment committees and arbitrators that the
parties have failed to nominate. Thus, a list that contains more
names of potential arbitrators will offer the Chairman of the
Administrative Council more choice. At the moment, less than half
of the parties to the ICSID Convention avail themselves of that
right and nominate members in the List of Arbitrators. 197 If more
195 News Release, ICSID, New Designations to the ICSID Panels (Aug 29,
2012), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases
.jsp.
196 Under the ICSID Convention.

[t]he Centre maintains a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators
pursuant to Articles 12-16 of the ICSID Convention. Each ICSID
Contracting State may designate up to four persons to each Panel. The
designees may, but need not, be nationals of the designating country. In
addition, up to ten persons may be designated by the Chairman of the
ICSID Administrative Council. Each designee normally serves for a
renewable term of six years.
News Release, ICSID, New Designations to the ICSID Panels (Feb. 8, 2012),
available at https:/ficsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases
RH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Anno
uncements&pageName=Announcement104.
197 At present, 108 out of the 158 member states have made some forms of
arbitrators' selection. See ICSID, Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of
Arbitrators, ICSID/10, at 4-6 (Sept. 2013) (providing a list of the 108 states which
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parties to the Convention nominated diverse arbitrators, this
would increase diversity substantially. While there have been
some efforts to urge Member States to designate their members in
the Panel of Arbitrators, the efforts are still inadequate and more
can be done. For example, there could be a yearly reminder sent to
parties urging them to make selections. Additionally, when new
members join -like Kosovo and South Sudan have recently donethey should immediately be advised to make their selections.
Fourth, the ICSID and the PCA Secretariats could develop a
best-practices policy for parties and third-party appointing
authorities to include diversity as an item to be considered when
making arbitration selections. These guidelines would not be
mandatory, but would enumerate and describe the issues to be
considered when making appointments. They could highlight the
existence and importance of diversity as a consideration when
making appointments. To be effective, these guidelines should
explain the benefits of diversification and include statistics related
to past appointments.
None of these measures require Member States' authorizations
and can be immediately implemented by the appointing
authorities. If explained carefully, they will not be seen as an
imposition to the parties, but, rather, a form of assistance to
decision making.
4.2.2. Actions By Parties

Although most of the new nominations will likely result from
appointments by the neutral appointing authority, parties can also
be urged to include diversity in their choice. Many governments,
which by definition are one of the parties to the dispute, have
policies mandating diversity. These policies should be used for the
selection of arbitrators and the nomination of members of the panel
of arbitrators. Further, best practices given to parties can provide
background and reinforce the importance of diversity and new
appointments.
Moreover, as a general policy, data on the lack of diversity
should be publicized. While anecdotal evidence is often discussed,
it is now possible to back that evidence with hard data. The data
have designated panel members), available at https:/ /icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&req
From= ICSIDPanels&language=English.
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should be publicized to counsel, practitioners and stakeholders. In
conjunction with the lack of diversity, the benefits of diversity
should also be made known.198 Additionally, and more concretely,
the data should be included in ICSID's and PCA's annual reports.
This dissemination of information would foster dialogue among
stakeholders, organizing conferences, and public statements.
Once the appointing authority tests new and diverse arbitrator
appointments, the confidence and reliance of new arbitrators will
trickle down to party appointments. This will eventually result in
a larger pool of arbitrators. Appointments of new candidates
should be publicized by the parties involved and can be used to
strengthen support of domestic constituencies and other
stakeholders. For example, the United States is the only country to
have appointed three women as arbitrators in its disputes.
Publicizing this fact would strengthen the US's position amongst
critics of international arbitration.
Although these measures will take time to bring concrete
results, these soft measures would ensure that a larger pool of
arbitrators is available. Importantly, because they have been
vetted by practice, these arbitrators will find support within the
international arbitration practitioner circle.

5.

CONCLUSION

International investment arbitration process is still a relatively
new species among the international dispute resolution genres.
As Professor Brigitte Stern suggests "Darwinism applies to
arbitration." 199 The difficulties international investment arbitration
198 This includes the inclusion of more points of view in the discussion of a
case, resulting in a better and more thorough decision and time saved, because
there would be more available arbitrators.

199

An Interview with the Honorable Charles N. Brower and Professor Brigitte Stern,

ARBITRATION TRENDS (Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP), Winter 2013, at
13 (quoting Professor Brigitte Stern as stating: "Darwinism applies to arbitration:
I see evolutions, criticisms and further evolutions. Four years ago, I was in a
colloquium at Columbia University where the central topic was the legitimacy
crisis of the system of international arbitration. I said at that time that, a [sic] far
as I was concerned, this looked like a crise de croissance, a teenager's crisis, the BIT
revolution having only started some 18 years ago. The teenager is now in his
twenties and should become more reasonable .... It is true that some countries
have manifested their discontent with recent awards or annulment decisions and
that some countries- Bolivia in May 2007, Ecuador in July 2009 and Venezuela in
January 2012 - have denounced the ICSID Convention ... [t]his is certainly a sign
of dissatisfaction but should not be overestimated.").
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suffers are the normal products of its evolution. Criticisms will
allow the growth and betterment of the system. As academics and
practitioners, we should ensure the evolution of the species, not its
extinction.

